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ORDER OF FINAL ARGUMENT IN MINNESOTA
CRIMINAL TRIALS
MARILYN VAVRA KUNKEL** AND GILBERT GEIs
1. INTRODUCTION
To Americans, one of the most familiar legal adages is that the
accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the American process of adjudication,
the accused is granted procedural advantages and safeguards which
serve to enhance his invulnerability to miscarriages of justice. It is
an American legal truism, only rarely disputed, that it is preferable
to lose a score of convictions than to find one innocent person guilty.
In at least one aspect of American criminal trial procedure,
foreign commentators have discerned what they consider to be a
basic weakness in these fundamental guarantees to the defendant.
They often focus their barbs on the order of summation which is
adhered to almost universally in American criminal trials. One con-
tinental writer, for instance, reports that the French believe that
Americans "have no conception of fair play to the accused," but in-
stead possess "the souls and minds of hangmen" because we do not
have a rule such as inculpi a le dernier la parole (the accused is
entitled to the last word).' Other commentators have noted that the
French procedure, allowing the defense to address the jury last, is
an "absolutely essential" safeguard2 and that it possesses "great
advantage for the accused."3 Another writer, commenting on Ger-
man procedure, maintains that the prevalent European order of
argument4 should be adopted in the United States, particularly since
"every criminal lawyer will appreciate the tactical advantage of such
a rule." 5
*Assistant Professor of Sociology, Los Angeles State College.
**Graduate student, University of Oklahoma.
1. Crabit~s, Why American Criminal Law Is a Failure, 23 A.B.A.J. 697
(1937). See Dalloz, Code D'Instruction Criminelle Annot6 D'Apres la Doc-
trine et la Jurisprudence, art. 335 (1957).
2. Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Procedure,
5 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 169 (1956).3. Coudert, French Criminal Procedure, 19 Yale L.J. 335 (1910). See
also Fred, Aspects of French Criminal Procedure, 17 La. L. Rev. 749 (1947) ;
Gardner, Criminal Procedure in France, 25 Yale L.J. 271 (1916); Hogg,
French Criminal Procedure, 23 Can. B. Rev. 853 (1945) ; Tyndale, Organiza-
tion and Administration of Justice in France, 13 Can. B. Rev. 667 (1935).
4. See, e.g., RMttegangsbalken, July 18, 1942, c.46, §§ 6-10 (Sweden);
Keedy, Criminal Procedure in Scotland, 3 J. Crim. L. 824, 839, 852 (1932).
5. Meyer, Criminal Procedure in Germany, 41 A.B.A.J. 592 (1955). See
Straffprozessording of Feb. 1, 1879, amend, in 1924, art. 258. See also Neu-
mann, German Criminal Procedure, Manual of German Law, II, 149 (1952);
Wolff, German Criminal Justice, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 155 (1944).
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The only exception in the United States to the foreign strictures
on American criminal trial procedure is found in the State of Minne-
sota.6 The relevant Minnesota statute provides that:
When the evidence shall be concluded upon the trial of any
indictment ... the plaintiff shall commence and the defendant
conclude the argument to the jury.7
This measure was introduced in the State Senate in 1875, appar-
ently as a separate matter not connected with any plan of adoption
or revision of court procedures. 8 A number of attempts have been
made to alter the statute. The Minnesota Crime Commission twice
recommended that the state have the right to reply to the defense's
argument to the jury. The Commission's report of 1927 emphasized
that such a change would not constitute a reversal of the order of
argument, but would merely amend the section to give the prose-
cuting attorney a short reply or rebuttal argument. The report
noted:
Under present procedure, if a fallacious argument be made by
the defendant's attorney, an unwarranted appeal to sympathy, a
misstatement of the evidence, no answer by the state is possible.
Should defendant's attorney say what would be ground for re-
versal if uttered by the county attorney, not only is it unanswered
but, if an acquittal results, no reversal is possible to correct the
error, because a verdict of not guilty is final.
Moreover, the present practice is peculiar to Minnesota. In all
other states, the final word of counsel to the jury is given to the
prosecution. That rule is based upon the logic of the situation.
The party having the burden of proof is regularly accorded the
final argument. It is submitted that this rule is peculiarly apt in
criminal cases, where ... the state has the burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the greatest burden of proof known to
the law.9
Nevertheless, the statute has not been altered and, today, accord-
ing to one observer, "agitation for change continues, but the legisla-
ture does not appear inclined to make it."1°O
This paper is an attempt to determine the extent of support for
a change in the statute in Minnesota and, more importantly, to
6. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 447 (1947).
7. Minn. Stat. 631.07 (1953).
8. Letter from Louis C. Dorweiler, Jr., Director, Minnesota Legislative
Research Committee, Sept. 19, 1956.
9. Minnesota Crime Commission Report 34 (1927). This recommenda-
tion was renewed in the 1934 Commission report, which pointed out that the
change was also being urged by the legislative committee of the Minnesota
County Attorneys Association. Minnesota Crime Commission Report 47
(1934).
10. See note 8 supra.
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evaluate the effect of this aspect of Minnesota's unique criminal
procedure on the determination of guilt or innocence. This latter
question will be considered both on the basis of answers by persons
having had experience with the statute, and by recourse to the
experimental findings of contemporary psychology.
To aid in this study, a questionnaire"' was sent to each of the
87 county attorneys in Minnesota, and also to an attorney, selected
at random, in each county. Responses were received from 128 indi-
viduals. Five incomplete questionnaires were discarded. Of the
remaining 123, 68 came from prosecutors and 55 from the private
attorneys.
The prosecutors and private attorneys split, as might be ex-
pected, in their attitude toward the statute; each group tending to
support its particular interests. Thus, although 56% of the 123
respondents voted in favor of retaining the statute, this percentage
would likely have been higher had the poll been taken of a group
more representative of the Minnesota bar.
The breakdown by groups is shown in Table 1.
Opposed to In Favor of No
Group Statute Statute Opinion Number
Prosecutors ...... 60% 35% 5% 68
Other
Attorneys ....... 14% 82% 4% 55
Combined
Response ......... 40% 56% 4% 123
II. RESPONSES OPPOSED TO THE STATUTE
Prosecuting Attorneys
The basic argument advanced in opposition to the statute was
that under existing law the defendant in a criminal trial possesses
all the procedural advantages,' 2 while the state is burdened with all
the disadvantages. 3 Thus, one respondent maintained that in some
instances, "it is almost impossible to prove guilt to a jury because
11. Many of the quotations in the text of this article are taken from
the responses to this questionnaire and will not otherwise be authoritated.
12. Advantages to the defense which were mentioned include the pre-
sumption of innocence which carries with the defendant through the trial;
the state's lack of direct, positive evidence which often forces it to rely on
weak circumstantial evidence for conviction; the inability of the state to use
a written confession as evidence unless there has been a signed receipt for a
copy attached to the confession; the defendant's right to refuse to testify;
and lastly, the rule that disallows the prosecution to comment upon this
failure.
13. Cf., Gustafson, Have We Created a Paradise for Criminals?, 31 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956).
1958]
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our hands are tied even in a good strong case." These advantages,
it was claimed, should be offset by granting the state the right to
final argument. It is noteworthy that implicit in this position is the
view that such a right is a real advantage to successful prosecution.
The most persuasive contention of these prosecutors is that
defense counsel may wander far afield in his final argument, includ-
ing irrelevant, often prejudicial material, and possibly misleading
comments on fact or law. Defense counsel may interject any number
of theories on the evidence that the prosecution cannot annswer. One
respondent concluded that "... this statute ... enables the defense
to throw out a last-minute red herring." The state's remedy is
limited to corrective instruction by the presiding judge and the
unwise tactic of objecting during defense counsel's argument.
Furthermore, the state may not appeal an acquittal, which fact,
coupled with the defendant's right to make the final argument "gives
the defense attorney a tremendous advantage." 14 Thus, as a practical
matter, "the defense can get away with any flight of fancy and pre-
judicial argument. The prosecutor cannot answer. If, in final argu-
ment, the prosecution anticipates the defense's argument, he can
get into difficulties." One defense counsel admitted that, "I felt I
had a distinct advantage in making the final argument as I could
lambast the prosecution without fear of rebuttal."
A second contention of the prosecutors who favored a change in
the law was that since the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt,' 5 the considerable burden thus placed upon the state,' 6 and
given emphasis by the trial judge's instructions, 7 should be balanced
by allowing the prosecutor the final argument.
In support of the claim that the prosecutor should argue last, it
was suggested that the same abuses now existing would be avoided
since appellate courts, "look carefully at the prosecutor's statement
and will tolerate nothing improper; in similar manner the trial judge
14. This county attorney argued that "the only restraint on his [the de-
fense attorney's] argument would be the judge and for the judge to interfere
with an argument is often prejudicial."
15. E.g., "It is a rather elementary principle that the party having the
burden of proof should also have the last argument.... I see no good reason
or for that matter any reason for such a statute as Minnesota's."
16. "Because the prosecution has the tremendous burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, I feel that the 'last word' would be of great value. The
defendant would not be placed in a less favorable position as he still retains
all constitutional safeguards."
17. "The judge's charge in the criminal case necessarily is favorable to
the defendant because they are told that they have to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty. This, of course, places a considerable burden upon
the state and to offset this, we believe it should have the final argument.
The judge's charge is, in my opinion, really an argument in favor of the
defendant."
[Vol. 42:549
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is more likely to allow the prosecutor less leeway on argument than
he does the defense since only the defendant can appeal the case and
thus upset the whole trial."
Seven of the 41 prosecutors in favor of changing the statute felt
that a rebuttal argument,1 s rather than a complete reversal of the
order of speaking would be desirable. The prosecutor would then
not have the difficult job of anticipating and overcoming arguments
of defense counsel and "it would serve to keep defense counsels'
argument within bounds because of the opportunity to explain that
he was not properly arguing the evidence." 19
Because the rights of the accused in a criminal trial are thought
to be adequately protected by constitutional safeguards without the
additional advantage of having the final argument before the jury,
the majority of prosecutors in Minnesota can see no valid reason
why this statute peculiar to their state should be retained.
Other Attorneys
The "other attorneys" sampled who favored a change in the
statute supported their position by reference to the burden of proof
argument. Each pointed out that in civil cases the plaintiff has the
"final word" and by analogy, so also should a criminal prosecutor.
Particularly should this be true, they argued, in that the required
degree of proof in civil cases which the plaintiff must bear--i.e.,
"preponderance of evidence," is less stringent than the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" requirement in criminal cases. Therefore, a
fortiori, the prosecutor should argue last.
III. RESPONSES FAVORING THE STATUTE
Prosecuting Attorneys
The prosecuting attorneys who favored retention of the Minne-
sota statute generally considered it essential to the protection of the
basic rights of the defendant.20 They admitted that the present pro-
cedure complicated their own effectiveness. Another observation
18. E.g., "Undue advantages are too often taken by defense attorneys
which could be very easily explained in most cases by a few minutes' re-
buttal .... .
19. As another prosecutor expressed it: 'While the statute has not par-
ticularly hampered the prosecution of those cases where the defendant is
patently guilty, because of the fact that there is no appeal by the prosecution
on law or fact, it has resulted in permitting the defense counsel on occasion
going afield in argument."
20. E.g., "Although I dislike not having the closing argument when
prosecuting a case, I sincerely feel that under our Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence it is much better to lose several prosecutions than it is to
convict an innocent person."
1958]
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was that the prosecutor possesses a great many advantages such as
unlimited funds for investigation and superior investigatory ma-
chinery plus cooperation with state and federal enforcement agen-
cies."' It was claimed that, "In order to balance the equities, it is
perhaps right that the defense shall have the final argument."
Other Attorneys
The "other attorneys" who favored retention of the statute
generally emphasized either that all reasonable advantages should
be given the defendant in a criminal trial,2 2 or that the state already
possesses overwhelming advantages which need to be balanced by
allowing the defendant the final word to the jury.23 These attorneys
were in agreement with the prosecutors favoring the statute in citing
the superior investigative facilities of the prosecutor as the main
advantage of the state. One interesting comment was that the state
should not receive a conviction unless its evidence was such that it
could withstand the final argument.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STATUTE
It was implicit in the responses discussed in the previous two
sections that the right of making the final argument carries with it
some advantage. 24 This section will examine the respondents'
opinions on the extent of that advantage.
21. In addition, it was argued that the prosecutor "has the general
respect and belief of the community. For example, many persons on a jury
argue that if the defendant was not guilty he would not be prosecuted in the
first place. . .
22. E.g., "I believe the statute gives more protection to the defendant's
constitutional rights, and tends to prevent over-zealous and prejudiced prose-
cuting attorneys from making remarks that cannot be answered."
23. A particularly lucid comment questions the function of the prose-
cutor:
Are we interested in convictions or prosecuting the innocent? A prisoner,
without money, has about as much chance as a snowball in hell. The state
has crime investigators and can spend any sums to get evidence. The
prisoner has no money. He is, in most cases, unable to even call a lawyer
or get anyone to investigate and question witnesses.
The routine: first arrest--'scare hell out of the prisoner'-get him to
make written statements. If he refuses to scare, then spend money to
investigate and get witnesses against him-'scare the witnesses.' The
average citizen is in fear of the law and when confronted with officers
allows words to be placed in his mouth.
24. The advantage of final argument is illustrated by Clarence Darrow
in one of his summaries to the jury:
Under the laws of Idaho the State has the last word, and when my voice
is silent, and when Moyer and Haywood cannot speak, their accusers can
be heard pleading against them. I know the ability of the eminent gentle-
man who will close this case. I know the appeal he will make to this jury.
I know that he will talk of law and order and the flag which the mine
[Vol. 42:549
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There was general, though hardly overwhelming, agreement that
the statute tends to lessen the number of convictions which the state
is able to secure. As Table 2 indicates, 52% of the respondents felt
that the statute leads to fewer convictions, with 39% believing that
it makes "little or no difference" in the outcome of criminal trials.
Table 2
Consider-
ably Somewhat
Fewer Fewer Little
Convic- Convic- or No No
Group tions tions Difference Opinion Number
Prosecutors ..... 13% 43% 31% 13% 68
Other
Attorneys ...... 5% 42% 49% 4% 55
Combined
Response ....... 10% 42% 39% 9% 123
Responses Indicating That the Statute Leads to
Fewer Convictions
Two major reasons were advanced in support of the conclusion
that the statute leads to fewer convictions. First, that the average
jury is highly vulnerable to strong arguments by counsel. A typical
comment was that "defense counsel is able to leave a more vivid
impression on the minds of the jurors than his opponent ... since
jurors are quite impressionable. ' 25 Secondly, that when all factors
such as ability of counsel26 and the merit of the respective cases
are seemingly equal, the order of argument may be decisive. It is
important to note, here, that the burden of proof imposer on the
state would not seem to be met if at the time of closing argument
the state has established no more than an "equal" case.
owners have described time and again. I know the suspicious circum-
stances which will be woven into that appeal and handled by a tactful
tongue and a skilled brain, and I must sit and listen to it without chance
to reply.
See Busch, Prisoners at the Bar 44 (1952).
25. However, one county attorney argued that: "I have found that thejuries here take their job so seriously that regardless of the impassioned or
logical argument of counsel, they will very seriously consider and accept the
law as given them by the judge." Another interesting comment is to the
effect that: "While I do not believe the order of argument is too important
where intelligent jurors are assured, it does become an important factor where
statutes (as in Minnesota) excuse nearly all intelligent persons from jury
duty."
26. "A seasoned prosecutor can, in the average case, overcome the handi-
cap of the statute against mediocre opposition; but if the defense has a top
notch counsel, the statute proves to be quite a burden."
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Responses Indicating That the Statute Makes
Little or No Difference
The advocates of the position that the order of argument makes
little or no difference in the outcome of the case imply that although
in a situation where all other factors are equal, the order of argu-
ment might be crucial, such a situation occurs infrequently, if at
all.2 7 Other respondents believed without qualification that the
order of argument is of no importance, primarily because of the
effectiveness of the judge's instructions in neutralizing summation
arguments.
V. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EvIDENCE
Many of the respondents indicated that they are never certain
which of several possible factors might have been decisive or
significant in leading to the jury's decision. One respondent sug-
gested that "psychologists could probably tell you more accurately
the advantage, if any, of having the final argument."
The psychological evidence, however, is no more conclusive
than are the opinions of the attorneys. Still, the sparse psychological
research does tentatively point to a conclusion that was completely
ignored by the attorneys; that the initial argument may be the more
significant in determining the jury's decision. While there is a rather
commonly held opinion among writers in the analogous field of
debate that the last argument is the stronger,2 experimental work in
psychology-apparently confined to a single major study by Fred-
erick H. Lund29 -indicates that the first argument might well be the
more effective.
In this study, Lund distributed printed arguments to several
groups of students and after testing them on the material presented,
concluded that the first argument was the more influential in form-
ing their conclusions. He adopted a "law of primacy," noting that:
A belief gains a certain personal connotation.... To have formed
an idea and inwardly to have yielded to its persuasive influence
is sufficient to make it seem ours and something to which we owe
27. A rural county attorney commented:
In all except extreme penalty and strong emotional appeal cases, I be-
lieve it makes no difference because facts are facts and the more
'maneuvering and twisting' done by defense counsel, the more our sound,
logical rural juries intuitively sense the weakness and inconsistencies of
the defense and decide rightly.
28. Collins & Morris, Persuasion and Debate 195 (1927) ; Stone & Garri-
son, Essentials of Argument 235 (1916).
29. Letter from Frederick H. 'Lund, Oct. 23, 1957. "I know of no other
study, outside of my own, dealing with the importance of order of presentation
from the standpoint of influence and persuasive value."
[Vol. 42:549
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allegiance. Thus, the first time a proposition is presented to us we
tend to form an opinion and we do so according to the influences
present to shape it. Later, such an opinion may gain a certain
emotional content if it is contradicted. This follows because of
its personal reference and because we would not have our ideas
appear frail and inconsequential."0
Lund formulated a similarly effective "ideal of consistency"''3
which he maintains tends to make persons remain consistent with an
opinion to which they have committed themselves. In applying his
findings to argument before a jury, Lund concludes that:
Our form of jury trial ... assumes that both sides are given on
[sic] equal opportunity. But the existence of such equality...
assumes that logical factors will control the decision of the
judges or jurymen .... But our beliefs are rarely if ever fash-
ioned through such dispassionate weighing of pros and cons.
While the lawyer for the plaintiff is reviewing his case and mak-
ing his appeal, the belief of the jurors is already in the process
of formation, and they are not to be dissuaded from their position
by an equal amount of evidence or persuasive appeal on the part of
the defendant's lawyer ... 32
Lund's work, however, does not appear to be altogether applica-
ble to the context of a courtroom trial, despite its intriguing and
suggestive similarities, and its provocative hypothesis. For in-
stance, he employed written rather than oral stimuli. Also, in a jury
trial, the closing arguments essentially reiterate previous testimony
rather than introduce a fresh subject. In addition, the procedure of
the jury trial is very likely deeply impressed in the juror's mind; he
knows that he will be exposed to two arguments and that he is ex-
pected to be receptive to both.3" More importantly, in the reality of
the Minnesota procedure, the arguments are not necessarily of equal
30. Lund, Emotions of Men 40-41 (1930). For summaries, see Hollings-
worth, The Psychology of the Audience 99 (1935) ; Ruch, Psychology and
Life 52 (1948).
31. See Lund, The Psychology of Belief, 20 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psych.
184, 190 (1925):
We feel called upon to be consistent in the same way as we feel called
upon to be rational, or as we feel called upon to observe any other ideal
which has gained social commendation. Once we have committed our-
selves we dare not relinquish our position lest we be challenged with our
former statement.
32. Lund, op. cit. supra note 30 at 40.
33. Lund would counter this analysis by saying that personality or back-
ground factors are at work while one is listening which influence the forma-
tion of a position. An individual is not capable of a purely objective attitude.
He cannot be a mere recipient of information. Thus what is presented first will
not necessarily be dislodged by a later argument of equal merit. Letter from
Frederick H. Lund, Oct. 23, 1957.
1958]
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weight. The defense can both rebut the prosecution and can raise
questions which are not susceptible to response by the prosecution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Minnesota's unique statute which allows the defense to deliver
the final address to the jury has often been the subject of controversy
in the state. The opposition to the statute is based on the premise
that it places an undue burden on the prosecution. Those favor-
ing the statute on the other hand, believe that it represents another
item assuring protection of the rights of the individual. Both those
opposed, and those in favor of the statute generally agree that the
right of final argument carries some advantage. A majority believe
it results in fewer convictions.
Agitation for change of the* statute is apparently not as strong
as might be expected. This survey found that 56% of its respondents
favored retention of the law, although only 35% of the county attor-
neys took this position. The percentage of favorable opinions among
all bar members might well be greater than 56%.
It was shown that psychological experiment on the importance
of the order of argument has produced inconclusive findings. Field
work, using recordings and mock juries, such as that being done at
the University of Chicago in its program on Law and the Behavioral
Sciences, would be highly useful in arriving at a better evaluation
of the importance of the Minnesota method.
Finally, noting the absence of definitive experimental evidence,
the concomitant absence of significant agitation for change, and
the large number of sentiments citing the statute as one which
uniquely implements the philosophical core of American jurispru-
dence (and noting as well, the strong criticisms of the procedure in
the other 47 states by foreign observers), the inescapable conclu-
sion appears to be that the Minnesota statute is one to which the
state might, at least at this stage of our knowledge of its actual
operation, point with considerable pride.
[Vol. 42:549
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF
EVIDENCE PRACTICES: INTELIGENCE
RonaERT S. REDmOUNT*
A. CURRENT CONCEPTIONS AND MEASUREMENTS
OF INTELLIGENCE IN LAW
Intelligence is a common denominator of the litigation process.
It inheres in the acts of the judge and jurors, the litigants and wit-
nesses. In fact, the structure and mode of operation of the trial
process itself depends upon the common skills and understanding of
all the participants. Expressed in general terms, the legal prerequi-
site is for so much intelligence as will give the litigated acts and
proceedings a "rational" character. In many cases individual liti-
gious acts may call for a higher degree of skill and comprehension
on the part of liable parties. For example, in tort cases physicians
and surgeons and other professional individuals may be held to a
very high level of intelligence and knowledge, commensurate with
that represented in their profession, before they can avoid liability
for their professional acts.- Trustees, particularly corporate trustees,
may be held to a comparatively high level of skill and intelligence.2
Trial proceedings, however, effect no such special requirements.
Legal measures of intelligence, where necessary, are expressed in
terms of the most primitive and essential facilities of an individual
capable of rational thought and behavior. Sense impressions must
achieve a level of common experience and interpretation. Under-
standing must afford some basis in logic. The precise standards are
a matter of impression.
I. Litigants
Standards of behavior for litigants tend to dwarf intelligence
and to subsume it under the more deliberate concern for their pur-
poses and motives on the one hand, and on the other, concern for
the normality of their behavior expressed in terms of community
standards. For example, the determination of sanity in criminal
cases, or of contractual or testamentary capacity, are instances
where there is a judgment of intelligence. However, in legal con-
ceptual terms the problem is mostly one of determining the posses-
sion and manifestation of requisite skill or intent to enter into acts
*Research Associate, Yale University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Butler v. Rule, 29 Ariz. 405, 242 Pac. 436 (1926) (physician
held to the standard of skill and intelligence of his profession in the per-
formance of his professional duties) ; Comeaux v. Miles, 9 La.App. 66, 118
So. 786 (1928) (same).
2. See, e.g., Harris v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200
S.E. 652 (1939).
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to which legal effects attach.3 Intelligence may be an incidental char-
acteristic in this determination and is seldom a focal matter. To cite
another instance, the concept of the "reasonable man" as applied in
tort law fixes a crude standard of intelligence and of behavior gen-
erally. Standards of reasonableness are fixed in pragmatic terms
and judged impressionistically. Reasonableness, and inferentially
the level of intelligence that will sustain a person against liability
for his acts, is governed by the level of skill for the act presumed to
be reflected in the "average" person in a like situation.4 This stand-
ard of community behavior, and the estimation of the person's be-
havior in relation to it, is expressed in the observations and experi-
ence, the thoughts and sentiments of judge or jury. But, it should
be noted that the concept of intelligence expressed here, as well as
its measurement, may be diluted by the operation of values and
other elements of behavior that have little to do with intelligence.
The law does not express itself directly on the matter of the
intelligence of litigants except in those circumstances where there
is suspicion of utter deficiency in sense impressions or in logical
conception. A fairly typical instance, where the issue of a litigant's
intelligence per se might arise, occurs in sex offenses. In the case
of rape-complainants, for example, the intelligence of a child victim
may be a crucial determination, and may reflect on the merits of
bringing litigation based on the complaint. Certainly the rape-com-
plainant as witness is subject to attack for lack of capacity to testify
if marked intellectual deficiency is suspected.5
II. Decision-Makers
The standards of behavior for decision-makers are initially a mat-
ter of political policy expressed in statutes and practices governing
the selection of these personnel. The minima of intelligence sug-
gested above may be stipulated, as in the instance of statutes gov-
erning the selection of jurors. They are assimilated into a standard
of qualification, designated "competence," that includes emotional
3. On criminal responsibility, which involves a determination of sanity
as a basis for personal liability in committing crime, see Weihofen, Mental
Disorder as a Criminal Defense, passim (1954). On contractual and testa-
mentary capacity, see Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo.
L. Rev. 141, 152-57 (1941). See also Atkinson, Wills 232-52 (2d ed. 1953).
4. See, e.g., Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501,153 A. 457 (1931)(standard of behavior is that of "average person of ordinary prudence");
Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931) ("ordinary
prudent man") ; Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing.N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1837) ("reasonable man of ordinary prudence"). See discussion of the
"reasonable man"' concept in Prosser, Torts 124-32 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. note
1 supra and related text.
5. See Note, Psychiatric Aid it Evaluating Credibility of Rape-
Complainant, 26 Ind. L.J 98 (1950).
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and moral as well as intellectual criteria. In the federal statute gov-
erning juror qualifications, for example, a person is "competent"
for jury duty unless he has been convicted of a crime; is unable to
read, write, speak or understand the English language; or is incapa-
ble of rendering efficient jury duty by reason of mental or physical
infirmities., Essentially the same personal skills are cited in similar
manner as prerequisites of juror competence in the various states.7
III. Witnesses
The trial process is most intimately concerned with the behavior
and intelligence of witnesses and it is to them that evidence rules
and practices most often apply. The witness, as an instrument of a
rational trial process, is required to have and to reflect certain basic
intellectual skills and comprehension." As to him, the characteristics
of intelligence necessary to the trial process are slightly ramified in
view of his particular role in litigation. He must be able to make
valid sense impressions of an event and give a common interpreta-
tion to these impressions. He must be able to carry over his original
observation to a later period without virtual obliteration through
loss or distortion. He must have sufficient skill to convey his obser-
vation and memory without significantly sacrificing accuracy to the
communications process. Comprehension of at least some of the
value implications of litigation is also essential, the importance of
telling the truth being paramount. Intelligence sufficient to under-
stand the nature and obligation of an oath to tell the truth consti-
tutes the general phraseology of the intelligence requirement. 9 Some
comprehension of the tools and techniques of discourse is also neces-
sary. It is important that the witness realize the scope and require-
ments of a question in examination and that he recognize the dimen-
sions of accuracy and completeness necessary for a full answer.
Wigmore phrases this requirement as a "capacity mzentally to under-
stand the nature of questions put and to form and communicate
intelligent answers."' 1
6. See 62 Stat. 951 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1952).
7. See Committee on Selection of Jurors, Report to the Judicial Con-
ference pp. 33-35 (1942). Cf. Note Psychological Tests and Standards of
Competence for Selecting Jurors, 65 Yale L.J. 531 (1956).
8. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 493-95 (3d ed. 1940), and McCormick,
Evidence 140 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Bielecke v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 355, 145 S.W.2d 189(1940) ; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 472, 5 S.E.2d 499 (1939). This
definition of intelligence encompasses both skill and social attitude. Cf. 2
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, § 495.
10. 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, § 495. Cf. Walker v. State, 97
Ala. 85, 12 So. 83 (1892) (a witness must have the capacity to "narrate the
transaction in what appears to be an intelligent, rational manner"). See also
McCormick, Evidence 140 (1954).
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These are the lowest acceptable requirements for a person to
qualify as a witness. The denominators rule out very few witnesses
on the basis of a lack of intellectual qualification. On the other hand,
neither do they presume to assure that this or a proximate level of
intelligence reflected by a witness is a guarantee of intellectual com-
petence sufficient to refute a challenge to the complete reliability of
his statements. While credibility is most often ascribed to interest,
character and stability, mediocre intelligence, whether reflected in
direct attack and examination or by impression, may afford a proper
qualification on the reliability of testimony.
a. The Legal Method of Inquiry.
A direct inquiry concerning a witness' intelligence is most likely
to arise when there is some doubt as to his minimum intellectual
qualification as a witness. As a matter of logic and practicality it
occurs most often when children are required to perform a testi-
monial function. A deliberate analysis of intelligence is then couched
within the framework of a polyglot legal concept termed "mental
capacity."' 1 The term assimilates intellectual, emotional and moral
qualifications in a loose collectivity. Intellectual efficiency sufficient
to produce reasonably correct sense impressions and minimally reli-
able recollection and narration is necessary. Emotional stability to
the degree that impression, memory and report are not critically dis-
torted is essential. Moral sensitivity so that there is an awareness
of necessity or duty to tell the truth is important.
Most witnesses, at the time they are called upon to testify, are
presumed to have the minimum mental capacity necessary for qual-
ification. A general presumption of mental capacity exists if the
witness is fourteen or older.12 A party may, however, disagree with
11. See 2 Wigore, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 492-501, and McCormick,
Evidence 140 (1954).
12. See 2 Wigmore, op. cit. upra note 8, §497 & n.1. The presumption
is reversed if the witness is under the age of fourteen. See Shannon v.
Swanson, 208 Ill. 52, 69 N.E. 869 (1904) (at fourteen there is a presumption
of competency but below that age there is to be an inquiry into qualification) ;
State v. King, 117 Ia. 484, 91 N.W. 768 (1902) (child under fourteen pre-
sumed to be incompetent) ; see also 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, § 508.
However youth and mental immaturity in themselves do not disqualify a
witness. See McCormick, Evidence 140 (1954) ("in each case the test is
whether the witness has intelligence enough to make it worth while to hear
him at all and whether he feels a duty to tell the truth."). See also Cargill v.
State, 25 Okl.Cr. 314, 220 Pac. 64, 65 (1923) ("intelligence, and not age,
is the vital criterion.") ; State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101, 102(1945) ("The principle... is that the child shall be sufficiently mature to
receive correct impressions by her senses, to recollect and narrate intelligently
and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth.") ; Hancock v. Hallmann,
229 Wis. 127, 281 N.W. 703 (1938) (feebleminded girl held not competent
under this test) ; 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 488, 505-09.
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this presumption and a witness' capacity may become a matter of
contest.1 3 The witness' behavior prior to his taking the stand may
belie the impression of adequate capacity. His conduct and response
in a voir dire examination may also issue doubts as to his fitness.
Other witnesses may bear evidence of the prospective witness' inca-
pacity. Finally, the witness' behavior in the trial process itself,
notably on cross-examination, may establish a strong inference of
a lack of capacity.' A special examination of the witness' capacity
may then be conducted by the challenging party or by the court,:5
and it is the judge's responsibility to render a decision as to the
person's fitness to be a witness.' 6
b. The Moral Component in "Mental Capacity."
The measures and standards of mental capacity tend to be crude
and impressionistic. Minimum moral qualification generally rests
13. See 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, § 497, and McCormick,
Evidence 149-50 (1954). If a party challenges the mental capacity of a wit-
ness, the burden is upon the challenging party to prove disqualification by
examination or other evidence, State v. Baker, 294 Mo. 303, 242 S.W. 405
(1922) ; Batterton v. State, 52 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 107 S.W. 826 (1908). See also
2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 484-85.
The capacity of a child witness is, of course, a matter of contest since the
presumption of qualification runs against the child and his capacity must be
established. See note 12 supra and note 15 infra.
14. Wigmore cites the four foregoing modes by which insanity may
appear. 2 Wigmore, op cit. supra note 8, § 497. These are also affirmed
generally as modes of determining the qualifications or lack of qualifications
of a witness. 2 id. § 485.
15. State v. Barker, 294 Mo. 303, 242 S.W. 405 (1922) (objector must
show by examination or other evidence) ; Batterton v. State, 52 Tex.Cr.R.
381, 107 S.W. 826 (1908) (semble); District of Columbia v. Armes, 107
U.S. 519, 521 (1882) (Court may examine); Ariz. Rev. Code § 4413 (1928),
Ariz. Code Ann. § 44-2701 (1939). (Court may examine). See also 2 Wig-
more, op. cit. supra note 8, § 497, and McCormick, Evidence 150 (1954). Cf.
note 20 infra.
In the instance of a child under the age of fourteen, where capacity is not
presumed, an examination may be required to establish mental capacity and
the court will then decide as to a witness' qualifications. Most courts insist
on an examination and positive findings, particularly in the instance of very
young children. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 480, 189 S.W.2d 686
(1945) (rape complainant six years old, courts failure to examine and ex-
pressly find sufficient understanding and testimonial capacity held to be
revers;ible error); Hughes v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 65 Mich. 10,
31 N.W. 603 (1887) (child under seven; failure to examine is reversible
error). On the other hand, some courts regard a failure to raise the issue of
a lack of capacity as a waiver of this deficiency in the testimony. Pooley v.
State, 116 Ind. App. 199, 62 N.E.2d 484 (1945) (witness a child of six; held,
unless competency of witness is questioned in the trial it cannot be raised on
appeal) ; Kiefer v. State, 258 Wis. 47, 44 N.W.2d 537 (1950) (competence
of infant witness not raised at trial; held, waived). In the latter cases, a pre-
sumption of incompetence under the age of fourteen does not appear to operate.
16. Desilvey v. State, 245 Ala. 163, 16 So.2d 183 (1944); State v.
Teager, 222 Ia. 391, 269 N.W. 348 (1936). See also 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 487. After the court has passed upon the witness' capacity, however,
the judge or jury may still conclude that the witness' testimony is not
reliable. Cf. notes 18, 21 and 22 infra.
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upon an assumption or a solicited verbal statement indicating the
witness is aware that some form of punishment may be expected to
follow a failure to speak truthfully when committed to do so. A
typical examination of moral qualifications as an aspect of testimo-
nial capacity will ask, in approximate language,"Do you know what
happens to anybody who tells a lie?" If the witness, who in most
instances is a child, gives a response indicating that punishment is
the consequence, the court may draw from this and related responses
the impression that the witness can and will act on the witness stand
under moral restraint.'1 The attending psychological inference is
that simple appearance or a simple verbal statement, each having
seeming credibility, is a responsive indication that the witness'
behavior is governed by a consistent sense of obligation to abide by
a conventional and mature code of ethics when asked to do so. The
guarantee of such behavior rests in the inference that the witness
adequately comprehends and is concerned with the consequences of
deviation, namely punishment in a material or spiritual form. The
moral commitment presumably is directed to the motive of the wit-
ness rather than to his intellectual capacity. It is intended to prevent
a failure of truthful exposition accountable to malefidious purpose.
It may not be reasoned that moral obligation prevents a failure of
truth accountable to a lack of intellectual capacities to recognize it
sufficiently, unless moral capacity is based on a presupposition of
intellectual capacities. The theory of the law on this point is not
altogether clear.
If a witness meets a standard of good impression in the test of
moral qualification, his credibility rather than his moral capacity
may properly come into focus. The measures of credibility, from the
perspective of moral requirements, focus more directly upon behavior
and reputation.-" The moral competence of a witness ultimately re-
lates to his ability and his motivation to tell the truth on the witness-
stand. His credibility, defined in these terms, is presumed to be
tested on the basis of estimations of character, particularly that
aspect of it that concerns veracity. The witness' moral propensities
for truth-telling, if cast in doubt by an adversary, are based upon
his reputation as a truthful person among those proximately situ-
ated so as to know of him. A substantial negative conclusion may
17. For instances and modes of examination, see Commonwealth v.
Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130 N.E. 495 (1921); People v. Delaney, 52 Cal.
App. 765, 199 Pac. 896 (1921).
18. See 3 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 920-30, 980-87, and
McCormick, Evidence 86-97 (1954). See also Ladd, Credibility Tests -
Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, particularly pp. 171-84 (1940).
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also be based upon evidence of the witness' gross misconduct or
upon a finding that he has been held legally responsible for criminal
acts. This is particularly true if the acts and conduct have entailed
the offering of verbal statements that were to have been relied upon
for their truthfulness.
Thus, character may be evidenced by prior misconduct having a
bearing on truthfulness, by conviction for crimes deemed relevant,
and by community reputation as reflected in hearsay. The psycho-
logical inferences in the moral tests of credibility are more clearly
directed to motive. Intellectual and emotional facilities for ethical
behavior are presumed. The basic inference is that individuals pos-
sess a truth-telling faculty that is invariant in its operation. Moral
disapprobation reflected in the opinions of others, in revelations of
palpable misconduct, or in prior punitive legal sanctions, is the evi-
dentiary basis for the non-existence or failure of the truth-telling
propensity. A deficiency found in this manner is not only sufficient
to form an impression that results in the discredit of testimony, but
it also in effect disestablishes the earlier presumption or finding as
to the witness' moral capacity.
c. The Emotional and Intellectual Components in "Mental Capacity."
The measures of emotional and intellectual capacity are given a
single footing. Minimum qualifications require only that the witness
make the barest contact with the world about him. "No person is
disqualified as a witness by reason of insanity, imbecility, disease,
intoxication, or any other form of mental derangement or defect,
except insofar as his condition precludes substantially all trust-
worthiness in his powers of observation, recollection or narration
on the specific matter to be testified."'19 Consistent with the level of
skill and comprehension solicited, measures and standards are crude.
Interpretation is entirely a matter of impression. Examination and
evaluation is usually effected in terms of the witness' general aware-
ness of the simplest events about him and in terms of the slightest
level of rational understanding of the proceedings.20 The underlying
19. Wigmore, Code of Evidence 127 (3d ed. 1942). Note that insanity
itself is not a basis for excluding testimony, unless the insanity can be said
to influence the witness on the particular subject matter about which he is to
testify. See District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519 (1882) (feeble-
minded person held a competent witness) ; Truttmann v. Truttmann, 328 Ill.
338, 159 N.E. 775 (1927) (mental defective held competent) ; Regina v. Hill,
5 Cox Cr.Cas. 259, 5 Eng.L. & Eq. 547 (1851) (witness suffering from
insane delusions not prevented from giving a rational account of matters on
which he testifies; not incompetent).
20. Perhaps a typical courtroom examination is presented in Horton v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S.E. 647 (1926). The witness, a child of ten,
was asked the following questions directed to the evaluation of her mental
capacity: How old are you? How many days in the week- month? What
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psychological inference is that emotion and intelligence have a com-
mon denominator in a very simple fund of general information,
evidenced by association, mostly about oneself, and a most elemen-
tary facility for logical reasoning. Given these free of any apparent
error and distortion, the minimum of intellectual and emotional ca-
pacity necessary to qualify as a witness is established in general
terms. It is inferrable to the specific situation represented in the
subject of testimony.
Again, however, the establishment of this minimum level of
efficiency, though serving for purposes of qualification, affords no
guarantee of the credibility of the witness' testimony. Some limita-
tion in the witness' emotional and intellectual capacities may be
apparent from impression and may be adduced in cross-examina-
tion.21 Even without cross-examination mere impression may in
fact operate as a basis for devaluing a witness' intelligence and hence
his credibility. Since impeachment for lack of credibility is entirely
a matter of impression and without articulate standards, appearance
as estimated by judge or jury, with or without examination, will
govern credibility.2
2
day is it -what year? Has anybody talked to you about this case? Would
you be punished for telling a lie? Presumably on the basis of the character-
istics of response the witness was held to lack capacity to testify in this case.
See also Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
- The Competency of Witnesses, 37 Yale L.J. 1017 passim (1928) for
reference to examination in the Horton case and references to like-kind
examinations in other cases. Cf. Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322,
130 N.E. 495 (1921).
21. See Henry v. State, 6 Old.Cr. 430, 119 Pac. 278 (1911) (witness
may be cross-examined with regard to his intelligence in an attack upon
his credibility); Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922)
(witness having been held competent by the court, the grade of his intel-
ligence can only be tested by cross-examination). The Blanchard case would
appear to rule out the use of expert testimony, intelligence tests results and
other extrinsic evidence as a means of attacking the credibility of a witness
on the basis of insufficient intelligent. But cf. United States v. Hiss, 88 F.
Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (psychiatrist allowed to testify, primarily from
his courtroom observation, as to the credibility of a witness). See also the
use of psychiatric expert testimony in evaluating the credibility of complain-
ing witness in sex cases. Note, Psychiatric Aid in Evaluating Credibility of
Rape-Complainant, 26 Ind. L.J. 98 (1950). See also Comment, Psychiatric
Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 Yale L.J. 1324 (1950),
advocating expert examination to assess abnormality that might significantly
affect the credibility of witnesses, and 3 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8,
§§ 991-96, advocating admission of psychological test results for purposes of
determining credibility.
22. Cf. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662, 662-63 (1922),
the court holding "the grade of his intelligence can only be tested by cross-
examination (in theory) and considered by the jury in the light of his
personal appearance and conduct." (Emphasis added).
While insanity may not of itself establish a lack of competence, it may
be used in evidence to attack credibility. See State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474,
65 N.W. 63 (1895) (evidence of insanity is not only for the judge on the
question of competency, but also goes to the jury on the question of credi-
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Proofs of emotional or intellectual inefficiency are of a gross
character, suggesting the total unreliability of testimony. Evidence
of this sort is generally of such substance as to in effect refute the
earlier finding or presumption of capacity. In the Blanchard case, 23
the court held that a witness could not be impeached by proof that
he was of a low order of intelligence where it was not claimed that
he was so deficient as to be "insane." "[A] ny grade of intelligence
above insanity would have sufficed .... 24 The claim of insanity,
that is, gross inadequacy amounting to mental deficiency, was re-
quired in order to attack credibility by reason of lack of intelligence.
In psychological terms the legal formulation suggests that in-
tellectual and emotional deficiencies are, from the point of view of
practical tests and effects, synonymous. The deficiencies are divisi-
ble in terms of particular kinds of facilities or areas of experience.
Therefore, their effects are not universal in relation to the organ-
ism. They are selective and do not necessarily influence the total
rational operation of the person. The deficiency, if operative in the
legal situation at all, is generally measured in terms of such sub-
stance and magnitude as to virtually disaffirm any skills and rational
comprehension on the part of the witness concerning the testimonial
subject matter.
The standards of ultimate judgment as to capacity and credi-
bility are governed by impression. The decision-maker is offered
appearances or reports which appear to virtually conclude the ques-
tion of testimonial reliability in dichotomous terms. He is left to his
own devices in formulating a decision as to the extent of the intel-
lectual and emotional capacities of the witness and the relationship
of this finding to the dependability of the witness' information. Con-
ceivably, the decision-maker's common sense and experience may
frequently direct finer and more extended calibrations on these
matters than the law theoretically allows. The specific bases of such
findings are inarticulate and likely to be unsystematic.
The concern of the present paper will be limited to the matter of
skill and comprehension based upon intelligence and intellectual
efficiency. Though legal conceptualization does not notably distin-
guish intellectual and emotional components of behavior, psycho-
logical theory and evaluation recognizes noteworthy distinctions
bility), and People v. La Rue, 62 Cal. App. 276, 216 Pac. 627 (1923) (insanity
bears on credibility). See also note 19 supra and 3 Wigmore, op. cit. mipra
note 8, § 932. The challenge to both competence and credibility may go to
the self-same matter of mental capacity.
23. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
24. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662, 663 (1922).
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that make differentiation of the factors important to the estimation
and understanding of behavior. Intelligence in the legal domain is
embraced in the concept of mental capacity and is denominated in
terms of the barest facility for rational behavior, as distinguished
from a complete lack of capability. Finer gradations on a higher
level of performance are a matter given to impression in subjective
terms rather than to systematic concept. Minimally reliable percep-
tion, memory and communication, and the simplest levels of com-
prehension are the measures of intelligence. The instruments of ex-
amination infer these capacities from simple verbal statements indi-
cating a simple facility for association in the production of elemental
information about oneself and from perfunctory facility for logical
reasoning. A general developmental progression in intellectual skills
is inferrable, based upon age. However, more precise gradations in
growth and qualitative variations among different facilities are a
matter of speculation and subjective impression. Demonstrable dis-
tinctions between capacity and efficiency are difficult to discern and
are not clearly formulated.
The status of legal thought and procedure in the matter of in-
telligence as a basis for testimonial evidence has been given some
slight attention. Hutchins and Slesinger, in an article in 1928,-5
focused their attention on the evaluative methods of law in relation
to intelligence and, by implication, might have recognized the plight
of the legal conceptual framework in this area. They suggested a
modification of method through the application of standard psycho-
logical devices that have been the subject of extensive and studied
treatment by psychologists. Wigmore, in his comprehensive treatise
on evidence and in his consideration of scientific methods of evalua-
tion, recognized the potential in psychological conceptions and
methods of evaluation. 26 Presumably, neither Hutchins and Sle-
siger nor Wigmore intended a careful study of the concepts and
measures of intelligence in order to determine with relative preci-
sion the nature and extent of their possible application in law. It is
our purpose here to study the psychological theses and evaluations of
25. Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
- The Competency of Witnesses, 37 Yale L.J. 1017 (1928). Cf. Hutchins and
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence- Memory, 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 860 (1928) and Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Wihtesses,
18 Cornell L.Q. 391 (1933). The latter two articles focus on processes-
perception and memory-that constitute a part of the more incorporative
concept "intelligence." The articles explore the psychological findings on
perception and memory and relate these to pertinent rules and practices in
the law of evidence.
26. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 997 (3d ed. 1940) and Wigmore, The
Science of Judicial Proof, particularly 761-92 (3d ed. 1937).
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intelligence and intellectual efficiency and to apply what is pertinent
and substantial to the legal problems of testimony.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND MEASURES
OF INTELLIGENCE
Conceptions of Intelligence
Upon examination of the prolific psychological literature on the
subject, intelligence appears more often as a term of convenience
than a term of rigorous definition. It is a way of describing the be-
havior of an individual to which the value "intelligent" attaches.2 7
The ascription of such a value depends upon the range and charac-
ter of activity which one deems important. On this point psycholo-
gists do not offer a conclusive point of view and generally fall short
of a full consensus.
In the main psychologists have evolved two conceptions of in-
telligence. One consists of a loosely-knit aggregate of skills whose
compass traverses a substantial proportion of the ingredients neces-
sary for adaptation and efficiency in most social situations. Binet28
was the earliest exponent of this method. He isolated a number of
skills and values important to school success and measured children
in terms of their relative ability to use and reflect these skills and
values in representative problem situations. The Binet technique is
the prototype of many intelligence measures in current use. Perhaps
the most widely used, aside from the Binet, is Wechsler's scales of
intelligence'.2 The scales, some of which are particularly geared to
27. In its abverbial form, intelligence connotes a process. Used as a
noun it gives the impression of an entity, a faculty, a possession of some sort.
The more articulate psychological opinion espouses the view that intelligence
is best identified simply as an adverbial or qualifying characteristic of be-
havior. See Chein, "On the Nature of Intelligence," 32 J. Gen. Psy. 111(1945). Cf. Whitner, "Has Man Meastred His Intelligence?" U.Pitt.Q., 38(Autumn 1941). Whitner states: "We may first refute any assumption that
mental tests have any mysterious power of detecting intelligence as an
entity apart from life performance. There is no such measure at present, and
the probability is that there will never be any direct measure of intelligence.
In fact, it is very doubtful if there is any such entity as intelligence. It is
much more defensible to say that a person acts intelligently than to say that
he has intelligence. The term 'intelligent behavior' is a description of behavior
under certain conditions. We can generally agree on what behavior is intel-
ligent even though we might never agree about the existence of some myster-
ious 'intelligence' within the individual. By analogy we apply the term
intelligent to the person who acts intelligently. People are considered more
or less intelligent on the basis of their behavior and in the practical world
past behavior is considered to be the best basis for predicting future behavior."
28. Binet, 1 tude Exprimentale de l'Intelligence (1903). Cf. Terman
and Merrill, Measuring Intelligence, passim (1937) and Anastasi, Psychologi-
cal Testing c. 1 &8 (1954).
29. Wechsler, The Measurement of Adult Intelligence (3d ed. 1944).
See also Wechsler, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Manual (1949),
and Freeman, Theory and Practice of Psychological Testing 187-88 (Rev.
ed. 1955).
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assess the intelligence of an adult population, present a series of
problems or tasks. Cumulatively, they measure a variety of skills,
the ability to: abstract relationships, develop and maintain associa-
tions, learn quickly and effectively, use generally valued social judg-
ment in common social situations, store and effectively use verbal
symbols, reason plausibly and in the direction of common social
value, perceive correctly common social entities, coordinate visual-
motor and thinking facilities, achieve order in social relationships
according to common standards, use numerical abstraction effec-
tively and master spatial relationships. Wechsler, through this ag-
gregate of skills, sought to assess the strength of direction, resource-
fulness and competence of an individual in camera.30
Intelligence, in the Binet style of thought, is not a narrowly de-
fined, scientific construct so much as it is a loose operational term
with some elasticity of content and boundaries and governed by
practical social values. It runs the gamut from largely perceptual
operations and adaptive skills to more complex logical operations
of great variety and adjustive-manipulative skills. It encompasses
social, moral and rational denominators with a particular emphasis
on facility for judgment. The components of intelligence are not
conceived in terms of inherited properties as distinguished from
acquired facilities, and it is not clear that there is, in fact, any solid
operational basis for such distinction. There is age variation and
other individual variations within the total range of skills. The suc-
cessive adaptation or adjustment of skills from one situation to an-
other and from one time to another is inferred. The various skills,
equally valued, combine to give judgment as to the probable satis-
factoriness of an individual's response in common social situationsa±
30. Wechsler defines intelligence as "the aggregate or global capacity
of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively
with his environment" Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 29 at 3.
Stoddard, in his analysis of intelligence, draws the full meaning of the
value implications of the incorporative, socially reflective view of intelligence.
He defines it as "'the ability to undertake activities that are characterized by
(1) difficulty, (2) complexity, (3) abstractness, (4) economy, (5) adaptive-
ness to a goal, (6) social value, and (7) the emergence of originals, and to
maintain such activities under conditions that demand a concentration of
energy and a resistance to emotional forces." G. Stoddard, The Meaning of
Intelligence 4 (1943).
31. Perhaps one of the most sophisticated concepts of intelligence is
that evolved by the distinguished Swiss psychologist Piaget. Appropriating
some of the more advanced theoretical constructs of science, he views intel-
ligence as an evolutionary process in which the biology of the individual and
his social environment combine to produce the strength and direction of
mental energy so as to provide increasingly logical order and equilibrium in
the relationship between the person and social reality. Piaget, The Psychology
of Intelligence, passim (Piercy and Berlyne transl. 1950). See also Piaget,
The Origins of Intelligence in Children, passim (1952).
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A second conception of intelligence, which relies upon the inher-
ent capacity of statistical method to distinguish various kinds of
rationally based facilities, lays greater emphasis upon the importance
of methodological rigor than upon the range of social practicality
and social experience. A number of investigators, most notably
Spearman3" and Thurstone,33 have utilized the statistical method
called "factor analysis" to isolate general and specific factors that
are deemed to be discrete and important parameters of intelligence.
Thurstone's several specific factors provide the rationale for hypo-
thetical questions which, when composed together, make up a stand-
ard test reflecting the factorial conception of intelligence. Thur-
stone has denominated the following factors in intelligence: W
(word fluency), N (facility with numbers), S (ability to assess spa-
tial relationships), M (memory), I (induction or reasoning), and
V (facility for verbal association and comprehension).
The factorial method has been utilized to identify parameters of
intelligence and to differentiate the intelligence of persons in terms
of physiological functions. Halstead34 compared brain-injured and
uninjured persons on a large variety of intellectual tasks and evolved
four factors of intelligence.
Factor theories of intelligence stress the importance of a com-
plex of logical skills necessary to resolve problems. They emphasize
entirely the strictly intellectual focus in behavior, and they begin
their measurement at a fairly advanced level beyond the experience
of mere perception and sensori-motor response. Both the range of
problems and the range of responses that serve to identify intelli-
gence are largely restricted to those in which logic is an essential
variable. A considerable constancy of response is implied, based up-
on the stability of the logical potentials in each individual, and is
given generalized effect in a variety of intellectually ordered sit-
uations.
The factor formulation of intelligence is at once more rigorous
and more limited than the "aggregate of social skills" conception.
It is the product of acute applications of statistical methodology,
32. Spearman, The Abilities of Man 164-67 passim (1927). Cf. Vernon,
The Structure of Human Abilities 7, 14-20 passim (1950).
33. Thurstone and Thurstone, Factorial Studies of Intelligence, Psy-
chometric Monographs No. 2 (1941). Cf. Anastasi, op. cit. supra note 28,
at 358-69.
34. Halstead, Brain and Intelligence, passim (1947). Halstead provides
a succinct summary and evaluation of attempts to relate intelligence to
neurological and physiological functioning and presents, as well, an over-
simplified review of psychometric and clinical conceptions of intelligence.
Id. at 8-30.
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but its relation to behavior spans a narrower range. Having the
virtue of precision, it is less likely to be misleading in its applica-
tion if carefully interpreted. On the other hand, it may be less useful,
particularly in any large variety of social contexts and social ex-
perience.
Theories of intelligence coextend with their underlying value
endorsements. They vary in range and method to the extent of
these preferences. To the extent that there is lacking some commu-
nity of agreement as to "what" and "how much" they offer no sub-
stantial, reliable and general conceptual basis. The biological struc-
ture of intelligence, as well as its social definition, lacks a concert of
opinion and there is today no semblance of finality in definition and
doctrine. As a matter of experience, however, the current concep-
tions of intelligence have proven viable and useful. There is suffi-
cient consistency in behavior and social experience, and sufficient
agreement on study and classification to effect considerable vitality
and functional value in today's concepts and measures of intelligence.
The Measurement of Intelligence
The measurement of intelligence is a function of the content of
the measuring instrument, dependent upon the choice of problems
to be presented, and a function of its structure, indicating the ways
in which responses can be assessed. The problems selected can be
identified with common experience and, in their requirements, bear
a hypothetical relationship to selected facilities of intelligence. The
adequacy of response is commonly ascribed to the speed with which
tasks are accomplished or the range of difficulty encompassed in a
graduated series of trials for each task. The variety as well as the
difficulty of tasks may be another determinant.
Typically, problems reflect the use of verbal skills. They are
couched in verbal terms, solicit the use and manipulation of verbal
symbols and require a verbal response to identify and perhaps to
qualify solutions. 5 Numerical and spatial skills, involving the use
of numerical and spatial concepts in question and answer, are also
35. For example, a stimulus word is presented and the subject may be
asked to give its meaning, or a word having the opposite meaning, or a
synonym. Another example of a verbal task involves the presentation of two
words that are analagous in certain respects. The subject may be asked to
identify and define the analogy. Other kinds of verbal problems frequently
used in intelligence tests involve the arrangement of sentences in logical
order, the definition of abstract terms and the intepretation of proverbs. De-
pending upon the levels of intellectual development being tested, verbal tasks
may range from simple association to complex logical reasoning and abstrac-
tion. Cf. Freeman, op. cit. supra note 29, at 129-97, 270-305; Anastasi, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 175-204, 351-86.
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frequent problem components.36 Occasionally tasks may be pre-
sented in pictorial or demonstrative form, may require identification
or physical manipulation of the problem materials and thus may
require demonstrative solutions rather than answers in some symbol
form. The different patterns of communicative skills, "verbal" v.
"performance," involved in a test are in themselves an important
basis for test selection and for differentiations in use. Where, for
example, a subject has language difficulty, a performance rather than
a verbal type of test may provide a better index of the subject's in-
telligence. Children, particularly at younger age levels, have de-
veloped motor, perceptual and some social skills further than they
have devoloped logical skills. They are likely to perform more
effectively on "performance" tasks. Where a visual or hearing
handicap exists, there is further basis for noting the distinction be-
tween verbal and performance tasks and for selecting a type of
intelligence test that does not emphasize skills on which an indi-
vidual would be particularly penalized because of physical, matura-
tional or cultural limitations.
Intelligence tests may also be significantly differentiated in terms
of whether they require or can accord to individual administration
or administration en masse and in terms of whether they pose a
limited or unlimited time requirement for completion. Administra-
tive feasibility and efficiency is the matter at stake here. Tests that
can be given en masse, or "group tests," can be used to test and
sample a large number of individuals in a short time interval. How-
ever, individually administered tests safeguard the character and
evaluation of responses more effectively since the test administrator
can personally observe and evaluate such factors as motivation,
emotional disturbance and the like. These latter are likely to have
a significant meaning for the nature of the result achieved by a
subject and ma create an appearance of intellectual deficiency or
lowered skill and capacity where such conclusions are not in fact
correct. Group tests are more prone to errors of estimation in gaug-
ing intelligence though they are substantially correct in their esti-
mates in the largest number of cases. Individual tests, on the other
36. Subjects may be given arithmetic problems of varying complexity to
solve or may be asked to complete a number series that is governed by a
particular mathematical operation. Tasks may range from simple counting to
those involving complex arithmetical reasoning. Spatial skill may be tested
in tasks involving the determination of the number of units in a complex
spatial structure whose complete dimensions can be grasped but are not
graphically portrayed in full. Tasks may require the detection of similarities
or differences in spatial structures graphically presented. Cf. Freeman, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 129-97, 270-305; Anastasi, op. cit. spra note 28, at 175-204,
351-86.
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hand, are not as economical of time and administration resources
but they are better adapted to special test conditions, such as sub-
ject's blindness or deafness, poor motivation, etc. 7
The rigorous demands and criticisms of research methodology,
in" their tendency to standardize the intelligence testing process and
the scales of judgment, have contributed to a large measure of com-
mon meaning and consistency in result. In such terms as "intelli-
gence quotient" and "mental age," "coefficients" of "validity" and
"reliability," "standardization" and "norms," the merit of a test
and the proper meaning of its result can be determined.
The terms of description and interpretation for the magnitudes
of score achieved on an intelligence test are generally standardized.
Mostly, reference is made to the "mental age" or the "intelligence
quotient" represented by a person's score on a test. "Mental age"
assumes, on the basis of test experimentation, levels of mental de-
velopment commensurate with levels of chronological development.
A person's "mental age" is, therefore, an index of his achievement
on the intelligence test relative to the achievement of persons at
different chronological age levels. If the individual scores above or
below the modality for his age level, he is above or below the aver-
age intelligence for his age.38 The "intelligence quotient," on the
other hand, is the product of a formula that expresses the relation-
ship between a person's accomplishment on an intelligence test and
a statistical average based on the results achieved by a larger and
representative population on the test. It may be based on the rela-
tionship between mental age and chronological age, or it may be
based on a different kind of formulation of the relative position of a
person's mental skills.3 9
The competency of a test may be judged by the way performance
on it compares with performance on some other criterion measure.
The statistical method of comparison is called correlation technique
and provides the test with indices of its validity. Results on a test
may be correlated with the results achieved by the same person or a
37. Freeman and Anastasi, in their treatises on intelligence, describe in
some detail the characteristics and uses of different intelligence tests. They
include a discussion. and differentiation of individual and group tests in
relation to the different purposes they serve. See Freeman, op. cit. supra
note 29, passin and Anastasi, op. cit. supra note 28 passim. See also Buros,
Fourth Mental Measurements Yearbook (1953) for a compendium, including
descriptions and brief critical reviews of existing psychological tests.
38. The concept of mental age and the technique for computing it is
described in Anastasi, op. cit. supra note 28, at 73-74, 187-91, and in Freeman,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 43, 133-35.
39. See Anastasi, op. cit. supra note 28, at 74-77, and Freeman, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 46-48. See also Wechsler, The Measurement of Intelligence
19-35 (1st ed. 1939).
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similar group on other intelligence tests, or they may be correlated
with the degree of success achieved by the same person or similar
persons on tasks that involve the skills measured by the testing
technique. Relatively high indices of correlation will indicate that
a test has relatively high predictive efficiency as a general measure
of intelligence or for the purpose selected. Such measures of com-
petence or efficiency are generally available for most widely used
intelligence tests.40
The reliability of a test, meaning the extent to which it gives a
consistent result, is another index of the value of a test. The self-
consistency, and hence the dependability, of a result achieved by a
test can be measured in terms of a statistical coefficient of test
reliability. One can compare results achieved on a test by the same
group at different sittings as a basis for determining the coefficient.
Another common method is to compare results when similar types
of questions in a test are separated so that the test is split into
two equivalent parts, and the results on one part are compared with
the results on the other. 41
The applicability of a test to a particular situation and the
significance of its estimate for a particular person may be judged by
the populations used as subjects in the construction of the test. The
standardization of a test-that is, the populations used to determine
the level of response for questions and the populations used to
provide a set of scores and test norms against which all future'
scores can be compared-provides the basis for determining whether
a particular individual or individuals can be accurately rated by
the test. If test scores and interpretations are based on results
achieved by children, the test may not be appropriate for adults. If
the standardization is based on the results of a group of South-
western farm inhabitants, this may not be appropriate and repre-
sentative for a group of Eastern urban individuals. The interpre-
tation of the results of any particular test or any particular person
will be governed by the extent to which the persons and conditions
of testing are similar to those utilized in the development of the test.42
In the main, intelligence test results and the mental ages and
intelligence quotients based upon them are comparable. The care
involved in the construction and in interpretation of tests in itself
40. See Anastasi, op. cit. supra note 28, particularly 127-45, 314-16, and
correlational studies mentioned for the majority of intelligence tests de-
scribed, passim. See also Freeman, op. cit. supra note 29, at 27-28, 31-38.
41. See Anastasi, op. cit. rupra note 28, at 94-119, and Freeman, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 10-26.
42. See Freeman, op. cit. supra note 29, at 38-41, 43, and Aanstasi,
op. cit .supra note 28, at 152-171.
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suggests that they are considerably more reliable on the average
than impressionistic assessments of intelligence. 43 Though faulty
to some degree in theory and technical application, they are a highly
perfected short-cut assessment of the intellectual potential and prob-
able rational skill and comprehension that an individual will bring
to bear in common life experiences and in new situations.
Personal and Social Factors Influencing Intelligence
Individual and social differences influence the existence and
estimate of intelligence in important ways. They must be recognized
if intelligence and intelligence test results are to be interpreted
correctly. In particular, considerations of age, social environment,
emotional barriers and psychopathology, and brain injury and
genetic deficiency, differentiate the structural and operational char-
acteristics of intelligence.
The dimension of age is of central importance. The passing of
time connotes the operation of physical and social processes which
differ in their effects upon intelligence. The effects accumulate and
result in modifications of intelligence, most particularly nearer the
beginning and the end of life.
Mental development taken as a whole has been reflected and
analyzed mostly through the measurements of intelligence tests. It
proceeds at a fairly rapid and consistent rate of acceleration in the
early, more formative years of life. The rate of growth diminishes
in the years just short of and just subsequent to puberty. At some
time between puberty and the early twenties there is a leveling of the
mental growth process and a peak of performance is achieved. There
then begins a gradual and slow decline into the middle years of life.
The process of retrogression accelerates in the later years, past
43. Psychiatric evaluations of intelligence focus on particular qualitative
factors rather than upon intelligence as a whole. Assessment techniques are
impressionistic, though based on a wealth of clinical experience and informa-
tion about behavior. Not infrequently the quantitative measures of psychology
are utilized for more precise estimations of magnitude of intelligence or
degree of intellectual deficit The study of intellect in psychiatric examination
most frequently focuses on the nature of thought content and the extent of
thought disturbance. The general character of a patient's response to questions
is analyzed for evidences of delusional thinking, aberrational preoccupations
and exaggerated concerns. Thought disturbance is sought in evidences from
response of erratic or faulty logic, poor memory and the inaccurate interpreta-
tion of general surroundings. These intellectual denominators are interpreted
as part of and in the context of the total configuration of the emotional and
social behavior of an individual. Cf. Henderson and Gillespie, Textbook of
Psychiatry 105 (7th ed. 1956) and Stresker, Psychiatry 65-84 (5th ed. 1952).
The diagnostic evaluation of possible mental deficiency of course involves a
more extensive and systematic evaluation of intelligence. There is generally
a heavy dependence upon the results of relatively more elaborate and more
extensive psychological test results.
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the ages of fifty and sixty, and becomes more noticeable and sub-
stantial.
44
While the pattern of evolution can be traced in general terms,
individuals differ considerably in their rates of change. Evidences
of an accelerated rate of decline and decrement may, for example,
be noted in comparative middle age in some persons. In others,
mental facility is relatively intact in all or many respects as late as
the seventieth and eightieth years.
Within the general conception of mental evolution, there are
differences in the pattern of development and retrogression for
particular kinds and qualities of mental ability. Roughly speaking,
it is not until the ages of ten or twelve, or thereabouts, that a child
develops a dependable sense of time, space and weight perception,
and reasonably accurate discriminations in various sizes and forms.
4 5
Patterns of thought in children are most frequently held to develop
from the concrete to the abstract, and the child's evaluation and
classification of experience, including his conceptions of causal
relations, may not reflect the correct use of logic until he is roughly
ten or twelve. Even then, however, the level of efficiency will vary
with the complexity of the problem to be deciphered.46
The child's fund of general information and his use of language
also acquires competence and reliability only with growth and ex-
perience.'7 Symbolic processes reflect the opportunities of experience
and education. Where these contacts are retarded reliable compre-
hension, explanation and communication are limited. Events depend-
44. Jones and Conrad report what is probably the most comprehensive
study available on the growth and decline of intelligence. See Jones and
Conrad, The Growth and Decline of Intelligence, 13 Genet. Psy. Monogr.
223 (1933). See also Intelligence: Its Nature and Nurture, 39th Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II (1940) for a number
of articles analyzing the evolution of intelligence with age (particularly
Bayley, Mental Growth in Young Children, and Gesell, The Stability of
Mental Growth). See also Wechsler, The Measurement of Adult Intelligence
54-69 (3d ed. 1944).
45. Patterns of development in various kinds of mental facilities are
succinctly presented and summarized by Thorpe, Child Psychology and De-
velopment, particularly 161-262 (2d ed. 1955). The more familiar theories
and experimental literature are covered in brief. See also Horrocks, The
Psychology of Adolescence 211-55 (1951).
46. See Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, passinm (Cook
transl. 1952). See also Thorpe, op. cit. supra note 45, at 220-21; Piaget, The
Child's Concept of Physical Causality, passim (1930), and Piaget, Judgment
and Reasoning in the Child, passim (Warden transl. 1928).
A review of conceptions of children's reasoning is presented by Johnson,
Development of Thought, 9 Child Development 1 (1938).
47. See Thorpe, op. cit. supra note 45, at 237-61. See also McCarthy,
Lanquage Development in Children, Manual of Child Psychology 476
(Carmichael ed. 1946).
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ing for their correct identification and explanation on the use of
words and upon thought processes may not be reflected with
reasonable accuracy until a child completes his elementary educa-
tion or its equivalent in experience. There is variation, of course,
not only in terms of individual differences in skill but also dependent
upon the complexity of the response expected of a child and upon the
subtlety of the situation he is asked to recognize or interpret. Where
simple perception under simple conditions is at stake, and the child
need only offer recognition, he is obviously competent to do so at
an earlier age than if he must offer extensive verbal interpretation
of a fairly complex set of events.
At the other end of the life scale, where mental skills are on a
decline, the greatest deficit occurs in tasks involving speed, raw
power and ingenuity. Age exerts its most adverse influence upon
native capacity or "sheer modifiability."48s Advanced age contributes
to greater difficulty in tasks involving problem-solving and con-
ceiving new relationships. Tasks involving the use of reasoning
require more time for successful completion by persons of advanced
age and may suffer in the degree of success achieved. On the other
hand, those tasks heavily dependent upon accumulations of experi-
ence may be more easily and adequately negotiated. Funds of
knowledge and information become greater, more important and
remain relatively stable with age.49
The effects of growth and age upon intelligence surely reflect
to some degree changes in the internal characteristics of an indi-
vidual. It is equally certain, however, that not only physiological
evolution but social experience as well has a telling effect on the
nature and extent of a person's intelligence.
The relative importance of natural endowment as an aspect of
organic processes and personal environment as an aspect of social
processes, has been the subject of heated debate by students of
"intelligence" for many decades.50 The debate has resulted in, and
has been the result of, extensive experimentation on the influence of
environment upon intelligence. A number of studies, mostly con-
48. Thorndike, Adult Learning 96-196 (1928).
49. See Jones and Conrad, op. cit. supra note 44; Foulds, Variations in
the Intellectual Activities of Adults, 62 Am. J. Psy. 238, 245-46 (1949) ; and
Foulds and Raven, Normal Changes in the Mental Abilities of Adults as Age
Advances, 94 J. Ment. Sci. 133, 141-42 (1948).
50. A good representation of some of the experimental literature that
provides the factual basis for controversy is contained in 39th Yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education (1940). See also 27th Yearbook
of the National Socity for the Study of Education, passim (1928).
51. See note 50 supra.
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ducted by proponents of the theory that intelligence can be sub-
stantially nurtured, suggest the marked modifiability of intelligence
which is reflected in substantial changes in intelligence test scores
under varying environmental conditions. Other studies, generally
effected by those who assign a greater role to inheritance in intelli-
gence determination, stress the important connection between
genetic characteristics and intelligence.51 The greater mass of ex-
perimentation would appear to associate higher intelligence test
scores with more complex and generally more highly valued social
environments. Race distinctions in scores tend to evaporate where
social environments for the races are comparable. "Backwoods"
children, and rural children as a group, perform more poorly than
city children and children living in more complex social environ-
ments, particularly on verbal tasks. Those in occupations that are
more generally highly valued, such as professionals, usually achieve
superior scores to those in the lesser valued, semiskilled and un-
skilled occupations. A high positive correlation exists between scores
on scales of intelligence and positions on scales of occupations. This
correlation carries over to the intelligence of children as related
to their father's occupations. In general, intelligence test scores tend
to rise with social status. The differences between all or most
social groups may in fact represent differences in the populations
measured, or they may represent bias in the construction and
standardization of the particular intelligence tests used.52
The compass of social environment as a conditioning factor in
intelligence can be subdivided into intellectual and emotional influ-
ences. Most experimentation upon the influences of social environ-
ment implies differential opportunity for intellectual growth in
various kinds of social activity and in various social settings. Some
studies reflect the critical effects of emotional deprivation as a
motivational deterrent to intellectual growth and the effective dis-
play of intelligence. Emotional deprivation and disturbance, reflected
in the extreme in advanced psychopathology, can substantially mod-
ify the operation of intelligence, both as to the kinds of skills affected
52. The references to investigations that have established the importance
of social milieu and social experience as a variable in intelligence are many
and scattered. Following are some representative references: Klineberg,
Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935) ; Wheeler, The Intelli-
gcnce of East Tennessee Mountain Children, 23 J. Educ. Psy. 351 (1932) ;
Shimberg, An Investigation Into the Validity of Nons With Special Refer-
ence to Urban and Rural Groups, 16 Archives Psychol. No.104 (1929);
Harighurst and Breese, Relation Between Ability and Social Status in a
Midwestern Comnunity: III Primary Mental Abilities, 38 J. Educ. Psy. 241
(1947).
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and the degree of intelligence manifest.53 Anxiety, if sufficient in
intensity, will constrict an individual's rational responses to situations
and will thwart the optimal display of intelligence. The more severe
forms of psychiatric illness, such as schizophrenia, may produce the
sharpest evidence of intellectual inefficiency. The psychiatrically
disturbed person's reservoirs of intellectual skills subserve and are
influenced by emotional needs and distortions, so much so that
these skills may no longer retain their integrity. Facility for sus-
tained attention and motivation may be diluted by emotional pre-
occupations. The progression of psychological disorder into a firmer
psychosis may be accompanied by disturbances in conceptual think-
ing and a functional loss of ability to abstract. The intellectual dis-
orders accompanying psychiatric illness may be substantially re-
versed, to the degree that recovery from illness takes place.
Physical injury or deterioration, notably brain injury and
deterioration associated with senility, may result in a more perma-
nent impairment of intellectual functioning. The ability to con-
centrate, or to think abstractly, may be particularly affected. 54 Brain
injury, occurring at or shortly after birth or in prenatal develop-
ment, is a major cause of mental deficiency. Mental deficiency, or
feeble-mindedness, is a diagnostic term to describe life-long, largely
irreversible intellectual inadequacy.5 5 A high correlation obtains
between the degree of intellectual inadequacy reflected in mental
deficiency and the degree of social incompetence the mental defec-
tive displays. Deficiency may range from the level of the high grade
moron, who may have the intellectual skills and may function some-
what like a twelve-year-old, to the idiot, who functions at no better
than the three-year level and lacks the most elemental skills for
survival.
The variegated character and the broad range of skill inhering
in the label "mental deficiency" is reflected in the uneven develop-
53. See, e.g., Hunt and Cofer, Psychological Deficit, Personality and
the Behavior Disorders c. 32 (Hunt ed. 1944) ; Cameron, The Functional
Psychoses, Personality and the Behavior Disorders c. 29 (Hunt ed. 1944) ;
Landis and Bolles, Textbook of Abnormal Psychology 460-78 (Rev. ed.
1950); and Mander and Sarason, A Study of Anxiety and Learning, 47
Abn. and Soc. Psy. 166 (1952).
54. See Landis and Bolles, op. cit. supra note 53. See also Halstead,
op. cit. supra note 34 passim.
55. Perhaps the best known and most widely used reference on mental
deficiency, detailing physical, mental and social characteristics of different
kinds and grades of mental defects, is Tredgold, A Textbook of Mental De-
ficiency (9th ed. 1956). See also Sarason, Psychological Problems in Mental
Deficiency (1949) ; Kanner, A Miniature Textbook of Feeblemindedness, 7
The Nervous Child 363 (1948) ; and Doll, The Feebleminded Child, Manual
of Child Psychology 863 (Carmichael ed. 1946).
[Vol. 42:559
BASES OF EVIDENCE PRACTICES
ment of the intellectual skills possessed by the defective individual.
Generally, greater learning difficulty and poorer skill is reflected in
those tasks that are of an increasingly complex and difficult character
which involve higher th6ught processes and more elaborate use of
symbols. It has been demonstrated that higher grade feeble-
minded individuals can learn and are most successful in the handling
of materials and assignments mostly dependent upon sensori-motor
and perceptual skills. Since the feebleminded person has difficulty
in mastering symbolic thought and relatively difficult systems or
classifications of events, communication may be awkward and its
interpretation treacherous. The true accuracy and dependability,
even of communicated perception, may be difficult to assess. Gen-
eralization concerning the degree of skill of the feebleminded is
hazardous because of the substantial range of skill and heterogeneity
of behavior the single diagnostic term connotes.
Taken as a whole, the industry of psychology on the subject mat-
ter of intelligence is impressive. The elaborate character of thought
and investigation upon this dimension of behavior provides the best
articulation now available on the conception of intelligence, its oper-
ational characteristics and its susceptibilities. None of the accumu-
lated knowledge is conclusive as to the proper understanding of
intelligence and no reassurance is afforded in the mechanical appli-
cation of information and techniques. The body of knowledge is
incomplete and any ultimate validity is indeterminable. There do
exist, however, trends and preferred understandings and applica-
tions suited to various conditions and needs. These provide some of
the cues and bases for intelligent judgment concerning rational
capacities and components in behavior.
C. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND REVISION OF TEE CONCEPTS AND
OPERATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO TESTIMONY
Current Legal Concepts and Practices
In the perspective of the deliberate and extensive study of intel-
ligence that characterizes the psychological approach, the articulated
legal formulation appears altogether too brief and schismatic. It is
insufficient from the point of view of a concept of intelligence, but
more particularly it is far short of an adequate understanding and
description of the range of intelligence operations in the courtroom
process.
Evidence rules and practices relating to intelligence address
themselves to the minima of skills essential to qualify testimony as
a rational characteristic in a rational trial process. In legal theory,
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the criteria of qualification are: (1) the perceptual facilities of the
witness which relate back to the experiencing of those prior events
that are now the subject of testimony, and (2) the witness' memory
facility and ability to use elementary symbols as conditions for the
present communication of the past events. A slight degree of logical
comprehension, sufficient to reduce questions to intelligible response,
and a slight awareness of the social implications of testimony, suffi-
cient to inhibit the deliberate assertion of grossly unreliable state-
ments, are also prerequisite. In practice, minimum intelligence
qualification is established as a result of impression gained from the
witness' total behavior. An elementary time-space conception, re-
flected in a simple awareness of one's bearings; elementary logical
capacity, evidenced in merely intelligible response; and an impres-
sion of cognizance to perform dutifully and as ably as possible pro-
vide the critical standards that must be met to establish eligibility.
Within the total range of human skill the requirements are so simple
that they are presumed to exist universally in adults. They become
an issue only if the presumption is challenged. However, even these
minimum skills are recognized to be a product of maturation and
development. Their existence in full maturity and with ultimate
reliability before the age of fourteen must generally be established.
Though the requirements are framed in terms of capacity, the
gauge is one of efficiency. The probable and actual performance of
an individual, rather than any estimate of his potential, provides the
measure of qualification. Demonstrations of skill under conditions
presented in court, whether in voir dire, direct, or cross examina-
tion, provide the index of intellect. Limitations for testimonial pur-
poses are deemed limitations in capacity, and exist without refer-
ences to sources of deficiency and to remediability.
The delineation of minimum intellectual standards for witnesses
does not of course define the general caliber of testimony and of
intellectual activity in the trial process. Nor does it define the general
degree of intellectual sophistication with which witnesses experience
events about which they provide testimony. The law implicitly rec-
ognizes higher and more complex levels of rational operation both
in the specific matters that are the focus of litigation and in the
general trial process that provides the medium for decision. In part,
the outcome of a trial reflects differences in the operation of intellec-
tual skills of witnesses and other participants, operative in relation
to the subject matter of litigation and in relation to the juridical
process itself. An intellectual measure exists, for example, in the
behavior and assessment of the witness at the time of and in relation
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to the subject matter about which he testifies. There is implicit a
partly intellectual standard of conduct to guide and to judge his
actions, usually framed in terms of plausibility and reasonableness.
There is also a separate intellectual measure in the manifestation
and assessment of the credibility of his testimony, whether or not
credibility becomes a matter of contest. The plausibility and reason-
ableness of statements, particularly after they have been subjected
to close examination and scrutiny, will determine whether he meets
a standard of performance sufficient to give his testimony substantial
effect in the minds of judge and jury. The standards of intellectual
performance are essentially inarticulate, derived more from intui-
tion and feeling than from relatively precise conceptualization and
careful estimation. They may presumably vary considerably as, for
instance, between witnesses and judges or jurors, and among wit-
nesses, or judges and jurors.
It may thus be generalized that at or near the minimum levels
of admissibility intellectual qualifications and characteristics, notably
of witnesses, are simply conceived and measured. The degree of
simplicity is such as to suggest error even in the light of the incom-
plete but relatively more extensive formulations of psychological
knowledge. In the normal and characteristic operations of presenting
and sifting evidence, the intellectual denominator is imbedded in
vague points of reference that are only subjectively understood. The
concept and measurement of intelligence loses articulation and its
importance as a vital denominator in the trial process and the trial
result is conceptually obscure.
The Psychological Conception
Intelligence in its psychological conception is, as we have seen,
a way of valuing behavior. The standard of measurement for judg-
ment is essentially the rationality of operations. The characteristics
of rationality pursue an evolutionary course. Early in life the indi-
vidual advances from perceptual and sensori-motor skills to a more
complex integration in behavior involving the use of logic and the
development of symbolic tools and language. The rate, kind and ex-
tent of growth show a wide variation within broad limits of nor-
mality that are statistically defined. In life's twilight rational opera-
tions become more erratic as physical faculties begin to fail and the
more complex kinds of intellectual skills lose their potency.
The adequacy of rational operations is tested in the comparative
performance of individuals on a variety of tasks that closely resemble
the experiences of social reality. A variation in technique stresses
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performance on tasks that are more abstract in nature but are pre-
sumed to measure facilities that are essential constituents in the
rational dimensions of general behavior.
The emphasis on individual assessment in general and essentially
abstract terms tends to obscure the interrelationship that constitutes
the substance of intelligenee. It is, on the one hand, a function of
stable conditions and the development of powers within the indi-
vidual. On the other hand, it is a function of the number and com-
plexity of the dimensions of tasks to which it is to apply. Tasks
with comparatively simple dimensions evoke the need for a compar-
atively simple range of skills. The extent to which an individual
reflects these skills will, as to the particular tasks, reflect the degree
of intelligence he possesses. As an example, if an individual is called
upon to make a simple identification and to relate what he saw with
a minimum of interpretation as to the meaning of events, it is rea-
sonable to say that correct perception, and little else, manifests a
high degree of intelligence in the situation. But if an individual is
asked to interpret a highly complex set of events whose comprehen-
sion requires an acute facility in the most difficult processes of logic,
evidences of perceptual skill and the logic and reasoning facility
normal to most social operations will not suffice to denominate a
person's behavior as intelligent. The estimate of intelligence, as
correctly stated in the law, is to be judged in relation to the demands
and needs of the particular situation in which it is to be utilized.t0
56. See note 19 supra and related text. See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence§§ 492-95 (3d ed. 1940). Variation in the requirements of intelligence in testi-
mony is the basis for not categorically excluding groups likely to be notably
deficient, such as mental defectives or some insane individuals.
The range of mental deficiency, as reflected in the extent and kinds of
social behavior involved, is substantial. See note 55 supra. Generalizations as
to lack of intellectual skills, particularly at the simplest levels of performance,
are difficult to make. Theoretically, witnesses may be called upon to reflect
only the simplest skills in their testimony, such as perception and then ele-
mental communication, and higher grade mental defectives would appear to
be able to perform effectively at this level. However, the conclusion is at least
debatable, and a high degree of reliability placed in any testimony of a mental
defective, who at best does not achieve a mental age above approximately
twelve years, is questionable.
The hypothesis of a possible area of reliability in the testimony of a mark-
edly insane (psychotic) individual may be even less tenable, at least as it is
determinable in the trial process. It runs counter to current psychiatric theory
in holding that particular skills and areas of experience may be divisible from
the area of operation of the illness. For the practical purposes of trial this
divisibility does not exist. Severe psychiatric illness is generally deemed to
pervade the personality and virtually all of its mental operations. Cf. Noyes,
Modern Clinical Psychiarty, particularly 1-10 (4th ed. 1953) on psychiatry
and "the mind;" Hendrick, Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis, particularly
141-67 (2d ed. 1939) on the structure of the total personality; and Alexander,
Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis, particularly 82-88 (1948) on the structural
theory of mental apparatus.
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Measuring Experience in Terms of Intelligence
From the point of view of its value in litigation, estimates of a
witness' intelligence are applied at two points. The intelligence of
the witness' behavior at the time of and in relation to the subject
matter of testimony is one such point. The other is the intelligence
manifest in the testimonial process itself. The witness' behavior in
connection with the'subject matter of his testimony is a function of
his proximity and relationship to the event. Within the limits of
these qualifying circumstances, the intelligence of his response to
the situation is a function of his skills. In some instances, where the
witness is only an observer at a distance, the optimal and effective
functioning of perceptual skills may be a sufficient guage of intel-
ligence. In others, where the witness' relation to the event is less
remote, the measure of his intelligence may be the variety and
facility of a number of skills.
The valuation and classification of various kinds and degrees of
experiencing different events, as a basis for estimating a person's
application of intelligence, is a monumental and impractical task.57
The range and complexity of events and the range and complexity
of modes of experiencing, searches to the ends and extremes of
ingenuity in human behavior. For practical purposes it is endless.
Only after litigation, and then only imperfectly, can the parameters
of a situation, including a person's relationship to it, be defined.
functioning of perceptual skills may be a sufficient gauge of intel-
ligence of his behavior, and then only as a matter of crude judgment.
But, expressed in terms of minima, it is hypothetically possible that
the most remote contact in the simplest situation - identifying a
party with possession of a weapon - may afford sufficient definition
for the setting of general minimal intellectual requirements for a
witness. An a priori requirement of normality in perceptual skills
may serve as the qualification of intelligence necessary for a witness
at this point of contact in the litigation. The sufficiency of this kind
of requirement as a general minimal qualification of intelligence
rests on the assumption that the witness' connection with an event
57. "Experiential capacity" is of necessity an essential in qualifying a
witness. That is to say that the general (as distinguished from the special or
expert) witness must have had some personal contact with the event about
which he testifies. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 554-56 (3rd ed. 1940). The
nature of this contact or experience is a matter of particular concern in the
eventual assessment of the testimony of a witness and may be subject to con-
siderable examination. However, criteria are poorly conceived for the evalu-
ation of degrees and kinds of experience, particularly as they relate to a large
number of possible events having a variety of characteristics. Impression,
utilizing a largely subjective scale, defines the weight of experience.
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and the event itself can be adequately reflected in terms of a simple
and single intellectual skill with considerable frequency.
The underlying assumption, relating to the adequacy of tests of
perception as a test of minimal intelligence in the experiencing of
events that become the subject of testimony, is open to some doubt.
It is more reasonable to assert that events in general, witnesses'
connections with them, and witnesses' behavibr are more compli-
cated. Generally, in relation to any event or experience, the witness
must not only be able to perceive but to interpret as well. The action
which he is called upon to describe, his own or someone else's, is
couched in a larger frame of experience. Normally, a witness "apper-
ceives"58 some or all of this experience. He apperceives it in terms
of values it reflects or in terms of his own values. He makes logical
interpolations and judgments that help to crystallize an event in his
mind. The breadth of his social experience, offering signposts of
recognition, is utilized to set the events and his related behavior so
as to provide him its meaning and a basis for remembrance. Where
the witneis has a communications function in relation to and
at the time of the event, however simple it may be, his participation
is more active. It is then even clearer that he may rely upon logical
processes, the use of symbols and a substantial social frame of ref-
erence, however efficient, as the irreducible and minimal intellectual
characteristics of his experience.
It may at least be argued that perception is a far too limited test
of minimal intelligence for a witness even in relation to the simplest
events he experiences and must recount in court, and certainly in
relation to most events. The witness' experience, even stripped to
basic contacts, usually relies on many more skills. In fact, to qualify
his intelligence in terms of perception alone may provide an alto-
gether incorrect inference that he could understand and interpret
an event with reasonable accuracy when in fact perception un-
attended by other skills would give clearly erroneous impressions.
58. "Apperceive" is defined "To recognize; interpret (new ideas, knowl-
edge, etc.) in terms of what is already known," and "apperception" is defined
as "Clear perception; relating of new to previous knowledge." Webster's Col-
legiate Dictionary (5th ed. 1936).
The point is here made that as to any event in social reality a witness
apperceives. The facility of perception, as a separate operative entity, exists
only under carefully constructed experimental conditions, essentially without
social references, and is achieved only with great difficulty. Varying degrees
of apperception, never perception alone, are brought to bear in all of social
experience. It is of course possible, in a limited number of instances, that the
degree of apperception necessary to understand, register and later communi-
cate an event may be quite limited, and may not go far beyond the use of
perception as a native skill unendowed with social experience.
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A witness, notwithstanding the connotation of the term, almost in-
variably does, and must do, more than perceive.
Intelligence, even at the simplest levels generally necessary for
a witness at the time he experiences an event, is a complex of skills
and experience. Reduced to basic elements it may be constituted in
the witness' range of general information and memory; his ability
to achieve logical as distinguished from other modes of explana-
tion ;'O his ability to use at least a minimum of social judgment, im-
plying the existence and operation of social values; his perceptual
skill; and his ability to understand and to manipulate verbal or non-
verbal symbols. As the experience he must relate, and his connection
with it, becomes more involved and complex, he may require the
same kinds of skills but with demonstrations of greater acumen.
The level of reliable intelligence in most circumstances is not so
much a matter of differences in types of skills60 as it is differences
in the degree to which skills are possessed and demonstrated as
experiences range from the simplest to the more complex.
It may be possible to give crude gradations, probably on an ad
hoc basis, for the appropriate degree of intelligence essential for
fully credible testimony in the light of the complexity of the event
to be reported by the witness and the extensity of his contact with
it. Witnesses of automobile accidents to which they are not a party
require a lesser degree of skills in making their role and account
meaningful than do witnesses of complex contract negotiations
which they have "observed." Perhaps in time a useful scale of typical
events and witness relationships to these events can be established
as a basis for determining the approximate degree of intelligence
necessary to give an account of each event substantial credibility.
With more practical certainty, however, many currently available
scales of intelligence can be utilized to assess the extent to which a
witness possesses the range of skills minimally necessary to qualify
his performance as meaningful and accurate in the general run of
events and experience that become the subject of testimony. Criteria
for minimal performance by the witness, based upon standards of
average or normal general intelligence, can be established. 61
59. Recollection should be made that logic is but one mode of explaining
causality and but one basis for defining relationships. In the earlier stages of
intellectual development, particularly, other kinds of explanation are utilized.
Cf. note 46 mtpra.
60. An exception may be said to exist where the witness must demon-
strate a high standard of performance in any one skill if his testimony is to
achieve a substantial credibility. For instance, a person relating the handling
of accounts may need to display a considerably greater level of numerical
facility than would normally be required of a witness.
61. Cf. note 42 stepra. Nearly all intelligence tests calibrate results and
distinguish interpretations of scores on the basis of a reasonably large sam-
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Measuring Testimonial Skill in Terms of Intelligence
The second focal point of a witness' contact with litigation, pre-
viously mentioned, is his testimonial performance in court. As Wig-
more has suggested, memory and communications skills are the
essentials of intelligent behavior here.6 2 Memory, and more partic-
ularly communication skills (whether of a verbal or non-verbal
character), represent a relatively advanced degree of intellectual
development. Communication is based upon the use of logic and
symbol systems. It implies a reservoir of underlying skills and prior
manipulations such as perceptual discrimination, selection from a
range of information, judgment based upon reasoning, and so forth.
The bases of intelligence in the art of testimony, even in terms of
a minimum qualification, are complex. The prerequisite is for a
range of skills such as are ordinarily represented in some psycho-
logical conceptions of intelligence and in a variety of intelligence
tests.63 Standards of minimum intelligence necessary for qualifica-
tion may be conveniently expressed in terms-of degrees of approxi-
mation to normal or average performance in a general population.
The calibrations afforded in intelligence test measurements and their
standards of interpretation are particularly suited for adaptation to
the process of estimating witness' intelligence in court, provided the
meanings and applications of the tests and scoring standards are
carefully studied and understood. 64
Standards of credibility of testimonial skill may vary with the
complexity of the information to be presented. A higher degree of
intelligence may be essential to make testimony comprehensible-
that is, memory and communications skills may need to be more
acute and complex-where the information to be given is highly
pling of "average" or "normal" population. This sampling creates a standard
indicating statistical distributions of intelligence, and values intellectual skill
according to where scores fall in the statistical distribution. Empirical tests
have demonstrated that decrements in scores away from the average represent
decrements in the degree to which an individual possesses the skills that make
up the composite of intelligence. Since tasks involving these skills constitute
the substance of intelligence tests, the reasoning regarding intelligence test
results is circular, but the tests are nonetheless serviceable.
62. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 493-95 (3d ed. 1940).
63. See notes 28-30 and 35-36 supra.
64. A careful consideration should be given to the range of skills meas-
ured in intelligence tests, the character of norms, with particular concern for
their representativeness, the interpretation to be given scores and their classi-
fication, and other desiderata in the choice and use of tests. See particularly
notes 37-42 and 52 supra. Technical deficiencies and social discriminations in
tests are particularly important to detect if the test evaluation of witnesses is
to prove sound and dependable. Correct selection and interpretation maximizes
the validity of results, and safeguards against the slovenly use of tests that
has been all too common and has led to gross misapplications and undepend-
able interpretations.
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complicated. Minimum facility in communication may be insufficient
and may, under these circumstances, afford distorted and highly
unreliable testimony. Tentatively, however, calibrations of memory
and communications skills necessary to creditably convey different
kinds of information may be unreliable and difficult to achieve. It
perhaps affords a task and a challenge for the future.
The Preference For Psychological Measures of Intelligence
The conclusion is offered that the intelligence of a witness, even
in terms of minimum qualification, involves an extensive set of
skills. Its application and estimation in the trial process is a com-
plicated matter to be judged in terms of separate dimensions. These
are: (1) the nature and complexity of events to be described, (2).
the witness' proximity and relationship to the events and (3) the
skills which he can bring to bear so as to give his experience, and
his testimony about it, a rational and reliable character. Formulated
in these terms, intelligence as now framed in concepts and tests of
mental capacity in law is much too primitive and inaccurate. Psy-
chological concepts and measurements are more extensive and
apropos, but they are also far from being complete and sufficient.
They offer less than an ultimate definition of the intelligence-as-
related-to-a-situation necessary for correct and sufficient estimation
in law. But notwithstanding, psychological conceptions and selected
intelligence test devices are well-suited to broad aspects of the con-
ception of intelligence applicable to witnesses, particularly to those
aspects relating to the witnesses' reservoirs of skills. They are more
complete and more accurate than conceptions and estimations now
afforded as a test of the competency, and perhaps of the credibility,
of testimony.8 5
65. It may be useful at this point to suggest a meaningful distinction
between "competency" and "credibility" as regards the intelligence of testi-
mony. Competence may be defined as the minimum level of intelligence neces-
sary to experience and report the general run of human events in an essen-
tially meaningful and accurate manner. In some comparatively few instances,
events markedly simple in dimensions may require less than this minimum of
intelligence necessary for the general or average range of experience. Since
these instances (involving essentially isolated behavior of the simplest dimen-
sions, requiring only the simplest level of observation by the witness from a
point of remote contact) are much in the minority, it is better to provide for
ad hoc exceptions to the general standard of competence than to reduce it
to a yet simpler level where it ceases to have any real meaning and effect for
the largest run of events that become the subject of testimony.
Credibility refers to the degree of intellectual skill manifest by the witness
in relation to the extensity of contact and the difficulty of the subject matter
which he experiences and must relate. It can be estimated at the time of his
experiencing and at the time of his relation. Necessarily, this level of intelli-
gence will virtually never be less than the level essential for experiencing the
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Psychological tests, though a shorthand method for assessing
the intellectual skills of witnesses, involve the introduction of ex-
trinsic evidence and, for greatest efficiency and accuracy, the use of
expert witnesses to correctly administer, interpret and communicate
the results. Test assessments of large numbers of witnesses in a trial
would be cumbersome and result in the prolonging of litigation. A
better policy would suggest that they be selectively used, preferably
where the intellectual skills of a witness are a critical matter in the
presentation and evaluation of his testimony. They should certainly
be applied in the relatively infrequent instances where minimum
skills must be evidenced. They may also be of particular value where
special requirements of intelligence are posited. As an example, they
would be helpful in assessing the performance of a witness where
testimony involves a particularly complex piece of information that
requires a high degree of skill in comprehension and communication.
They would be valuable in judging a witness' behavior where he has
experienced a complicated set of events requiring that he grasp the
significance of the whole if his testimony about the events is at all
meaningful and to be relied upon. Certainly where the witness is
the only source of information in these circumstances, and his skill
is in doubt, a systematic evaluation of his intellectual skills is impor-
tant and desirable.
Legal Procedure to Govern the Use of Expert Measures
of Intelligence
The character of rules regulating the introduction and use of
expert testimony based on intelligence test evaluation requires meas-
largest run of events, hence never less than that necessary for competence and
minimum qualification.
The standards of competence and credibility are thus quite different, and the
distinctions between the two cannot be obscured, as a practical matter, by
attacks upon one (credibility) which, if successful, virtually destroy the other
(competence). Cf. notes 21 and 22 supra.
"Reliability," as expressed in relation to intelligence, may refer either to
competence or to credibility. Its meaning may be derived from a determination
of whether the problem of competence, or the problem of credibility, is in-
volved.
The matter of determining competence or credibility may necessarily arise
at any time, depending upon the extent to which any stage of the witness'
participation in the trial affords an opportunity for observation and judgment.
See note 13 supra. Competence will most generally be determined before a
witness takes the stand but if later determined to be lacking the finding will
revert back to the beginning of testimony. Credibility will most generally be
assessed, for each part of the testimony presented by the witness, at the time
he gives that particular testimony. It may, however, be gauged at other times,
and ultimate judgment may result from an accumulation of impressions of
intelligence. These, if such is the process, should then be related back to the
particular phases of experience and testimony, credibility in relation to each
to be assessed in the minds of judge and jury in turn.
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ured thought and formulation. Certainly the use of experts6  to ad-
minister and interpret intelligence tests, and report the findings, is a
logically consistent part of the framework of examination that takes
place where competence is now brought into issue.67 The intelligence
test is, in fact, a more advanced, more systematic and more depend-
able examination technique than any now in use.68 It provides a
comprehensive measure of basic intellectual skills calibrated in terms
of statistically defined levels of performance, any particular level
being a measure of where the individual stands in relation to a large
general population. The refinement, in comparison to other exami-
nation techniques, is so far advanced as to warrant the use of the
intelligence test technique as the exclusive method of examination
for intellectual factors in the evaluation of competence. Yet, at the
same time, the results of any one test at any one sitting are not so
entirely dependable as to justify treating a particular test result as
a presumption regarding intellectual qualification. The intelligence
test result is the best evidence of the existence of the intellectual
component in competence. But it is rebuttable, preferably in terms
of another measurement of equal quality, as in the instance where
there are significantly discrepant results on the same or other intel-
ligence test assessments.69
Procedurally, the matter of a witness' competence arises upon
the challenge of one of the parties. The objecting party must then
demonstrate by examination the witness' competence and, in the
event of a contest on the matter, the judge must render a decision
as to competence. At the point where an examination is to be admin-
istered, it would seem proper and desirable for one or both parties
66. Almost invariably it is the trained psychologist who has the partic-
ular and the refined skill for intelligence testing that is necessary and desired
for the evaluation of trial participants. Mostly, psychologists are available in
colleges, universities and in medical and other public service agencies and
institutions. Increasingly, they are being added to public school systems, tojuvenile and domestic relations branches of courts, to industrial and com-
mercial firms, etc. The trained psychologist, suitable as a consultant on mat-
ters of intelligence evaluation, invariably has a master's and, preferably, adoctoral degree in psychology from a college or university accredited by
regional educational associations. He will have had one or more years of
experience, including individual testing experience, working with clients and
patients. The earlier experience will have been, directly or indirectly, under
college or university supervision as part of a program of training. He will
most probably be a member of the American Psychological Association.
67. See notes 15-17 supra and related text.
68. See note 17 supra and related text.
69. It should be noted that intelligence test results and their interpreta-
tion, for any particular person in any short period of time (measured in terms
of years), are likely to be highly consistent, if tests are correctly selected and
administered. The prospect of differences of opinion as to findings and theirinterpretation is much more remote than, for example, in the instance of diag-
nostic conclusions in psychiatric testimony.
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to make a motion for a single or separate expert examination of
intelligence out of the courtroom in lieu of the poorly contrived, ad
hoc examination procedures now conducted by the attorneys and
the judge in the courtroom. 70 The delay for the purposes of exami-
nation and report would be comparatively brief since tests can nor-
mally be administered and the results reported within a period of
two hours. The availability of experts on short notice is a matter
of planning and arrangement by counsel or court, involving either
a specific prearrangement where the issue of a witness' competence
can be foreseen in a particular case, or reference to a standing list of
available experts who may be called upon for fairly immediate con-
sultation.
The selection of experts would be a matter for the court's dis-
cretion, viewing particularly the qualification and availability of any
one or more persons. Leave should be given the parties to use and
to introduce evidence of their own qualified experts where there is
such a request. While, in theory,, this procedure could lead to the
"battle of the experts" so familiar in psychiatric testimony, in point
of fact there is relatively little dispute or discrepancy on the results
achieved by properly selected and properly administered intelligence
tests for a given person at any given time.71
The expert assessment of intelligence, as an aspect of the deter-
mination of competence, has not been submitted to a test of law.
There is, perhaps an analogue supporting legal acceptance in the
favorable view now generally taken of expert examination to establish
the credibility of prosecuting witnesses in sex offense cases.72 In the
case of intelligence test estimation relating to a particular level of
competence, there is greater speed and greater certainty in the pro-
cedure, the result is less open to contention, and the invasion of the
privacy and dignity of the individual examined is slight.
There may still infrequently arise, as has been suggested earlier,
the possibility that the minimum level of competence to be estab-
lished for particular testimony is below that reflected by the lowest
level of normality on an intelligence test. If, for example, simple
perception based on remote connection with an event is all that is
to be adduced in testimony, then certainly parties should be able to
address to the discretion of the court the argument that the usually
applicable minimal level of witnesses' competence should be waived,
and the traditional examination procedures in court should be per-
mitted.
70. Se note 17 vupra.
71. See note 69 supra. Cf. notes 35-42 supra.
72. See note 5 vtpra. See also McCormick, Evidence, 99 (1954).
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The legal procedure involved in the assessment of intelligence as
an aspect of credibility,8 is of a more complicated and uncertain
character. Consideration here involves not only the skills and abili-
ties of the individual, as an independent entity, but also the relation-
ship of these to the demands and requirements of a particular situa-
tion adjusted according to the degree to which the individual has or
should have participated in the situation. These latter matters are
presently too problematic in most instances to permit the setting
and application of any particular level of intelligence as a require-
ment to establish credibility. Where the parties agree, however, that
a high level of intelligence, (or some level other than the minimum)
would be necessary to give credibility to a witness' testimony re-
garding a particular experience, then with the approval of the court
the parties could stipulate the level of intelligence necessary to es-
tablish or impeach credibility. Only then would an expert assess-
ment and opinion of intelligence justify a substantial weight and
high probative value. But even, as is entirely likely, failing a stipu-
lation as to the level of intelligence to be involved in credibility, an
ingenious attorney could argue that the character of testimony of-
fered or to be offered requires a particular degree or level of intellect
on the part of a witness if his testimony is to be given full credibility.
He might then introduce, as evidence on the particular issue as he
has framed it, expert testimony based on intelligence testing regard-
ing the level of intelligence held by the witness or the prospective
witness.
The use of psychiatric expert opinion addressed to issues of
witnesses' credibility has been established in sex offenses cases and
had arisen in other instances. 74 Psychological expert opinion on in-
telligence as an aspect of credibility is of even sounder probative
value, and can and should be more readily admitted into evidence.
It should be left to the discretion of the court to decide whether its
value in any particular case outweighs the time and the diversion
of attention involved in its introduction.
Intelligence Estimates By Decision Makers:
Some Conceptual Guides
In the main, it must be assumed that a judge and jury's assess-
ment of the intelligence of a witness and, inferentially, the substan-
73. Thd term being accorded the definition given in note 65 supra.
74. See note 5 supra. See also United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Psychiatrist permitted to testify as to credibility of a
witness on the basis of courtroom observation.) ; cf. Psychiatric Evaluation
of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 Yale L.J. 1324 (1950).
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tiality and reliability of his behavior and testimony will be derived
from a subjectively defined set of inferences. The inferences will
relate to the nature and operation of intelligence in the abstract and
as manifest by the witness in his original experience and later testi-
mony about it. In this evaluative process, psychological formulations
and data are helpful in providing a more sophisticated set of con-
clusions.
Intelligence is best comprehended as a manifold of operations
conducted under a variety of conditions. The role of age, particu-
larly in relation to differential intellectual functions, is important to
recognize. In very young children, particularly those without benefit
of elementary school education or its approximate equivalent in
social experience, all phases of intellectual functions may be quite
unreliable by standards of adult performance. Except where utter
necessity demands, it may be the better policy not to rely in any
circumstance upon a younger child's testimony.7 5 Where reliance
is essential, only the most primitive facilities, such as perception,
may be sufficiently developed so as to convey any objective mean-
ing.76 Only as to these may any credibility be warranted and then
only if pitfalls in the communications process can be overcome.
The intelligence of older children, ranging from approximately
ten to sixteen, is better developed and reaching toward full matur-
ity. However, the extent of individual differences in the develop-
75. It is commonly proclaimed that "intelligence, not age, is the vital
criterion" of mental qualification as a witness. See note 12 supra. The opera-
tional skills, that is, the functional intelligence of an individual, is of course
partly a function of age. The fact of youth denotes the lack of full development
of intellectual skills. And, in the period of early youth, the intelligence of
nearly all children is, in important respects, unreliable and idiosyncratic when
compared to adult standards. See notes 45-47 supra and related text. The
optimum and most reliable interpretation of experience related by a child is
best negotiated in an informal, clinical setting where there is a sufficient
opportunity to make a fuller observation of his intelligence and behavior.
Deficiencies and idiosyncrasies, in terms of adult standards, can be more
apparent Interpreting the validity of the child's experience and communica-
tion in the narrow and formal confines of court, under a process of examina-
tion essentially insensitive to the many factors operative in the child's be-
havior, and invoking adult standards of judgment, does little to safeguard the
reliability of testimony and the formation of accurate conclusions. "Letting
the testimony in for whatever it may be worth" has little to recommend it as
a policy in this instance, where judge and jury, having no acute skills in
these circumstances, are more than normally likely to derive premature and
erroneous conclusions regarding the testimony. If the child's testimony is
utterly necessary, a more sagacious mode of examination in a more informal
setting and manner and away from the witness chair, is a minimal need.
76. See notes 45-47 supra. But see also note 58 supra, suggesting that as
to the skills and duties of witnesses' intellectual functions are almost invar-
iably complex. It may be quite difficult in most circumstances to reliably
reduce the function of a witness to a single or simple intellectual component
and then infer that this simpler requirement, if existing, satisfies the needs of
testimony.
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ment and patterning of various skills makes any generalization as to
the dependability of intellectual behavior in this age range extremely
tenuous. A favorable inference is difficult to assert if the events to
which the growing intelligence is to apply are strange and complex.
A reasonably safe negative inference can be made if the general
intelligence of a witness in this age range is below average or nor-
mal. In this circumstance, the dependability of intelligence functions,
particularly the more difficult functions relating to the use of logic
and symbols, is open to considerable doubt. Where a negative infer-
ence as to intelligence may prevail, by reason of the complexity of
tasks or the appearance of a generally impoverished level of mental
skills, intelligence test determinations, if made available, may be
quite useful in effecting a decision as to mental competence in the
situation.7 7
Somewhere in the later teens, ultimate skill and maturity in
intellectual functions is achieved. A presumption of intelligence in
relation to common social experiences may be said to exist.78
The declining years of life are also a period of declining absolute
intelligence, a factor to be recognized by judges of the reliability of
testimony. In particular, those skills highly reliant upon the use of
logic, abstraction and quick thinking are vulnerable to deterioration.
And, in addition, physical faculties begin to fail. A sensitivity to
this process of change, conceived within a framework that recognizes
extensive individual differences in the extent and distribution of
skills, and a variable rate of decline will enable more precise judg-
ments as to the reliability of a witness' intelligence. Where consid-
erable deterioration and enfeeblement is sensed, systematic psycho-
logical evaluation to assess the extent to which intellectual skills
correspond to normal adult operations, if made available, may help
to determine the dependability of the intelligence function. 79
77. Cf. notes 61 and 64 mtpra.
78. Currently a presumption generally holds that sufficient intelligence
for testimonial purposes exists from the age of fourteen. See note 12 supra.
If the critical age of fourteen is deemed to represent the ultimate point of
maturity of intellectual skills, the estimate is not too far distant from the apex
of development established by psychological studies. See note 44 Mupra. While
some studies suggest thirteen or fifteen as the age at which maturity of intel-
ligence is reached, many of the later studies suggest that the peak of develop-
mnt is somewhere nearer the age of twenty.
79. One possibility is to evaluate the older person's performance on
various parts of an intelligence test in terms of norms provided for the young
adult or the adult of early middle age. Norms at these age levels reflect rela-
tively stable and optimal intelligence in a general population. Another criterion
reflects not so much the general result of deterioration with age but the
losses relative to optimum efficiency at any given age for a particular person.
See Landis and Bolles, Textbook of Abnormal Psychology 460-78 (Rev. ed.
1950) on the measurement of intellectual impairment.
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For the most part, the estimation of the intelligence of a witness
does not depend on a distinction between intellectual capacity (re-
ferring to the individual's optimal level of skill under stable internal
and external conditions) and intellectual efficiency (reflecting the
extent to which skills are utilized) particularly in the light of any
psychological interferences. In so far as intelligence in adults is
generally stable, and the period intervening between the experienc-
ing of an event and testimony about it is relatively brief, the pre-
sumption is reasonable that differences in intellectual efficiency be-
tween these two points of reference is not significant. It is intellec-
tual efficiency rather than capacity that is the focus of judgment in
the evaluation of testimony. However, the intellectual skills mani-
fest by an individual may be more erratic and retarded upon injury,
and merit close scrutiny if severe emotional disturbance or brain
injury is evident or suspected at the time of testimony, or if either
has been operative at the time of the event to be reported or in the
intervening period between the experiencing and retelling of an
event.8 0 Evidences of intellectual malfunctioning and deterioration
may reflect upon the original experiencing of an event. Such evi-
dences may additionally or seperately reflect upon the reliability of
testimony. Systematic examination"' may help to determine the
extent of the disturbance and the remaining degree of competence,
at least at the time of testimony. Crude inferences may also be drawn
as to the operative efficiency of intelligence at the time of the origi-
nal experiencing of the subject of testimony by the witness.
In conclusion, it may be said that intelligence is an ubiquitous
phenomenon in the trial process and one of the most essential dimen-
sions of decision. As applied to any one of the human instrumentali-
ties of the trial process, it is a complex phenomenon. It ultimately
reflects the value attached to the intellectual skills of the individual
interacting with and deciphering a series of events of varying dimen-
sions and degrees of difficulty. The advances of psychology offer a
reduction of the phenomenon to some comprehensible and manage-
80. Cf. note 79 supra.
Brain injury and enduring emotional disturbance should be distinguished
from situational anxiety as a cause of intellectual failure and faulty and
unsatisfactory testimonial performance. A deterioration in intellectual skill
manifest on the witness stand may be the product of the overwhelming force
of anxiety in those individuals prone to disorganization in behavior when
stress is magnified. See reference to Mandler and Sarason in note 53 SuPra.
Cross-examination, particularly, may have this effect in some cases. The
consequence may then be not so much a reflection upon the intellectual skills
of the witness as upon the proficiency of the cross-examiner in harassment.
The distinction, particularly for the layman, may not always be easy to achieve.
81. See note 79 mspra.
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able proportions. The accomplishment is, however, far from suffi-
cient to provide for a careful ordering and estimation of intelligence
in the range of situations with which the trial process deals. Never-
theless, measuring instruments of the psychological science are usa-
able and, in the light of utterly impoverished alternative systems of
evaluation, preferable. Their reliable use is dependent upon careful
judgments and the application of large doses of discretion.
Mainly, intelligence, even in terms of its minima, has been in-
correctly or at least insufficiently interpreted in the law of evidence.
In its more normal manifestations in the trial process, the range of
its operations, and the possibility and need for its extensive and
systematic consideration, have largely been overlooked. This paper
offers only the beginnings of a fuller development of this denomi-
nator of the trial process. It focuses upon witnesses and their intel-
lectual skills. Much more concerted attention and careful study of
the operation of intelligence is merited if trials are to become ever
more systematic and reliable decision-making devices.

